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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (3)(j) and Rule 3(a) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court,
acting pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) transferred this appeal
to this Court by order dated August 31, 199 2.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the District Court correctly determined that

title to the property conveyed by Jacksons by Warranty Deed to
Mostrongs on or about September 1, 1987, was marketable?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of
fact and law.

As Mostrongs have challenged all of the District

Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, those findings
supported by the record that title to the property conveyed by
Jacksons to Mostrongs was marketable is reviewable under the
clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of
Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).

Whether the

District Court properly concluded that title to the property
conveyed by Jacksons by Warranty Deed to Mostrongs was marketable
is reviewable under the correction of error standard.

Marchant

v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).
2.

Whether the District Court correctly determined that

legal access from the property to a public road was represented
by the Jacksons to be along the lane running north from said
property and whether Mostrongs have failed
1

to sustain

their

burden of proof to support their claim that Jacksons represented
that there was legal access over the lane running south of the
property?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a question of fact

and is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard,,

Utah R.

Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886
(Utah 1989) .
3.

Whether the District Court correctly determined that

Jacksons did not make any fraudulent oi negligent misrepresentations to Mostrongs regarding access to the property?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of
fact and

law.

Those

findings supported by the record

that

Jacksons did not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations regarding access to the property is reviewable under
a clearly erroneous standard.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of

Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).

Whether the

District Court properly concluded that Jacksons did not make any
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations regarding access to
the property is reviewable under a correctness of error standard.
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).
4.

Whether the District Court correctly determined that

Jacksons did not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of
fact and

law.

Those findings

supported

by the record

that

Jacksons did not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home is reviewable
under a clearly erroneous standard.

Utah R. Civ. P.

52(a);

Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d

885, 886

(Utah

1989).

Whether the District Court properly concluded that Jacksons did
not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations regarding
the condition of the home is reviewable under a correctness of
error standard.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App.

1989) .
5.

Whether the District Court correctly determined that

there was no material mutual mistake of the parties or that there
was no material unilateral mistake on the part of Mostrongs
regarding access to the property or construction of the home?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of
fact and law.
was

Those findings supported by the record that there

no material

mutual

mistake

of

the

parties

or

material

unilateral mistake on the part of Mostrongs is reviewable under
a clearly erroneous standard.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of

Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).

Whether the

District Court properly concluded that there was no material
mutual mistake of the parties or material unilateral mistake on
the part of Mostrongs is reviewable under a correctness of error
standard.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).

6.

Whether the District Court correctly determined that

bank refinancing for the money owed to Jacksons under the Note
and Trust Deed was reasonably available to Mostrongs had they
pursued the matter further, particularly in view of Jacksons'
willingness to pay for the construction deficiencies noted by the
Millard

county Building Official and the lending

appraisers?

3

institution

Standard of Review:

This issue presents a question of fact

and is reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard.

Utah R.

Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886
(Utah 1989) .
7.

Whether the District Court correctly determined that

any rights which Mostrongs may have had to rescission under any
stated facts were waived by Mostrongs' failure to promptly notify
Jacksons of Mostrongs' intention to rescind the contract and by
Mostrongs' failure to tender back the property upon Mostrongs
learning of the lack of legal access over the south lane and upon
learning of alleged deficiencies in the construction of the house
located on the property?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of
fact and

law.

Those findings

supported

by the record

that

Mostrongs waived their right to rescission is reviewable under a
clearly erroneous standard.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of

Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).

To the extent

that the trial court properly concluded that Mostrongs waived any
rights they may have had to rescission is reviewable under a
correctness of error standard.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d

677 (Utah App. 1989) .
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances
or regulations

whose

interpretations

are dispositive

of

the

issues presented in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in
the Court Below
4

Mostrongs (Appellants) commenced this action in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Millard County, State of Utah, on
September 17, 1990, (R. 1-9), alleging fraud, misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract and mistake in
the purchase of real property located in Millard County, Utah.
Jacksons

(Respondents) filed a counter claim for damages and

attorneys' fees.
A bench trial was held October 28 and 29, 1991, and December
9, 1991, with

the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, District

Judge, presiding.

Judgment was entered on January 23, 1992, (R.

542) dismissing all claims of Mostrongs' complaint "no cause of
action."

Jacksons' counter-claim was also dismissed "no cause of

action."

Mostrongs and Jacksons were each ordered to assume

their own costs of Court and attorneys' fees.

Mostrongs filed

this appeal.
Statement of the Facts
1.

On or about October 26, 197 8, LeeRoy Jackson and his

brother, William Jackson, purchased real property ("property")
located near Fillmore, Utah from a Mrs. Geraldine Kessler.

At

the time of their purchase, Jacksons obtained title insurance on
the property

from Security Title Company of Fillmore, Utah.

(T.276:25;T.277:1-71; Ex. 38, Finding No. 2, R. 534).
2.

Mrs. Kessler originally owned a large, undivided tract

of land that included the property sold to William and LeeRoy

References to the Transcript of the trial shall be designated T. : . The number preceding the colon indicates the page
being referenced and the number or numbers following the colon
indicate the line or lines being cited.
5

Jackson.

The property LeeRoy and William Jackson purchased from

Mrs. Kessler represents the first lot conveyed from said tract.
3.
a

The property lies approximately 3/4 of a mile south of

public

highway.

(T.348:22-25,T.349:1-9; Ex. 51). The

lane

running from the highway to the property was the only available
access when Jacksons purchased the Property. (T.277:8-25,T.278:12,7-13). After purchasing the Property, Jacksons continuously
used the north lane for access as an easement. (T.278:7-12,T.382:
19-25,T.383:1-7) .
4.

Mrs. Kessler

subsequently

conveyed

tracts

located

north of the Jacksons" property, with language contained in each
deed, stating: "TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO a 33 foot easement
over and across the East 33 feet of said property for road and
utility purposes." (emphasis in original)(T.350:6-24; Ex. 51).
5.

On November 4, 1979, a Warranty Deed was recorded

conveying the property from William Jackson and LeeRoy Jackson to
LeeRoy Jackson and Margaret Jackson (Ex. 39). At that time, the
north lane provided the only access to the property. (T.277: 825,T.278:1-5) . No one ever contested the right of Jacksons or
Mostrongs to use the north lane for access to the property.
(T.335:16-24; Finding No. 3, R. 534).
6.

In approximately July, 1979, Jacksons constructed a

home on the property. (T.278:22-24).

When Jacksons constructed

the home, there were no building codes in effect in Millard
County.
Millard

The Uniform Building Code ("UBC") was not adopted by
County until March, 1981

(Ex. 42).

Millard

County

nonetheless issued Jacksons a building permit on July 18, 1979
that provided that construction must conform "to all ordinances
6

in Millard
Building

County, laws

Code

and

all

for the State of Utah, the Uniform
rules

and

decisions

of

the

Building

Inspector"(emphasis added). No final occupancy permit was sought
by Jacksons upon completion of the home due to the fact that
there was no Building Inspector employed by Millard County at
that time.(T.225:2-17,T.244:9-15; Finding Nos. 4, 5,R. 533-534).
7.

In 1979 Jacksons obtained verbal permission from Hal

Burdick, the owner of land adjoining the property on the south,
to construct a lane across the Burdick land to a county road, a
distance of approximately 1/4 of a mile. (T.237:6-13,T.278:1721). Jacksons graded this south lane and applied a cinder base.
Mr. Burdick subsequently sold his land to Ralph G. Tuckfield.
Jacksons

never

discussed

this

lane

with

Mr.

Tuckfield

but

continued to use the same without objection. (T.238:3-17, T.278:
14-16).

Jacksons used the south lane as their primary access,

but also used the north lane for access to the property. (T.246:
6-16; Finding No. 6, R. 533).
8.

Larry Mostrong offered LeeRoy Jackson $55,000.00 for

the property, but LeeRoy Jackson specifically said he would not
sell the property for less than $65,000.00. Mostrongs agreed to
pay $65,000.00 for the property. (T.63:12-20,T.112:7-22; Finding
Nos. 7, 8, R. 532-533) .
9.

Prior to signing the Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 1)

Larry Mostrong inspected the property on several occasions.

The

parties agree that the north lane and south lane were discussed
on these occasions.

(T.133:7-15).

Mostrongs

testified

that

Jacksons represented that the north lane was available, but the
south lane was the primary access, that such lane would be there
7

"always"

and

Mostrongs

that

would

the

have

south

lane was

to maintain.

a private

Jacksons

road

which

testified

that

Mostrongs were told that the north lane was the legal access to
the property and that the south lane was for convenience only and
was only a permissive use. (T.280:22-25,T.281:1-3, Finding No. 9,
R. 532).
10.

Mostrongs and Jacksons signed an integrated Earnest

Money Agreement on or about July 15, 1987 for a total purchase
price of $65,000.00. (T.63:24-25,T.64:1-2; Ex. 1; Finding No. 10,
R. 532).
11.

Two appraisals were performed on the property after

the Earnest Money Agreement was signed but before the September
1, 1987 closing.
concerning

access

Neither appraisal
to

the

property

identified

or

the

any problems

condition

of

the

property. (Ex. 2A, 2B; Finding No. 11, R. 532).
12.

At approximately the same time the parties signed the

Earnest Money Agreement, Mostrongs applied for a conventional
loan through

Zions First National Bank.

(T.64:3-12; Ex. 2 ) .

Mostrongs could not pay the required down payment for a conventional loan through Zions First National Bank, so on or about
August 4, 1987 they made application through Zions First National
Bank for FHA Financing. (T. 29:1-4; Ex. 2; Finding No. 12, R. 531).
13.
parent

On August 28, 1987, Zions First National Bank, the

company

of

Zions Mortgage

Company, denied Mostrongs'

application for credit due to insufficient verification of income
and because Mr. Mostrong was self-employed and had not resided in
Utah for a sufficient time to establish his income. (T.28:8-20;
Ex. 2 ) . However, Zions First National Bank specifically informed
8

Mostrongs that the bank would be willing to loan Mostrongs money
to purchase the property after they established a stable income
over a two-year period. (Finding No. 13, R. 531). Specifically,
Mr. Mostrong had to establish a two-year income requirement in
Utah to receive financing. (T.153:2-19) .
14.

Both

parties

still

wanted

to

complete

the

sale,

Jacksons stated they would carry the financing for two years to
allow Mostrongs to establish a sufficient income history and
residency in Utah. (T.32:7-12). The parties closed the sale of
the property on September 1, 1987 as memorialized by a Warranty
Deed from Jacksons to Mostrongs and a Trust Deed Note and a Deed
of Trust in favor of Jacksons (Ex. 4 ) . Mostrongs took possession
of the property. (Finding No. 14, R. 530-531).
15.

At the closing, Jacksons conveyed by Warranty Deed and

Mostrongs accepted only the property described in said Warranty
Deed.

The Warranty

Deed

did

not

specifically

include

any

easement for access from the north or the south. (Ex. 4; Finding
No. 15, R. 530).

Larry Mostrong testified that he repeatedly

asked LeeRoy Jackson about access to the property, showing his
concern regarding the access issue. (T.133:10-15). Nevertheless,
Larry Mostrong testified that he had read legal descriptions in
the past and that he had the opportunity to read the legal
description on the Warranty Deed he received from Jacksons at
closing.

When asked if it bothered him that it did not specifi-

cally call out the easements, he replied, "I didn't read it in
detail". (T.161:1-9).

Furthermore, Jennifer Mostrong testified

that she either saw or signed the documents at closing. (T.33:412) .

9

16.

Upon purchasing the property, Mostrongs obtained a

policy of title insurance on the property from Security Title
Company of Millard County ("Security Title").

The policy insured

access to the property (Ex. 14; Finding No. 16, R. 530).

The

policy also specifically insured against unmarketability of title
(Ex. 14).

The manager of Security Title, Mostrongs' agent,

testified that he knew there was no "recorded easement", but felt
there was an implied easement due to the work he had done on the
property and the intention that there was an implied easement to
the north. (A.[Abstract of Transcript] 7:18-25fA.8:1-11).
17.
only

All parties reasonably believed at closing that the

apparent

obstacle

to

bank

financing

was

residency for verification of Mostrongs' income.

the

two-year

(T.30:9-17).

When asked why he agreed to seller financing with the Mostrongs,
LeeRoy Jackson's unrebutted testimony was that Larry Mostrong
said he had sufficient money in a California bank and may cash
Jacksons out in six months, that he would be receiving a sizeable
amount of money on an upcoming construction

job, and that he

would pay off the debt within six months to a year. (T.282:2325,T.283:1-8) . The parties therefore agreed to seller financing
to give Mostrongs time to accomplish the intended FHA or other
financing as an interim measure.(Finding No. 17, R. 529).
18.

From September 1, 1987, the date Mostrongs signed said

Trust Deed Note, until shortly before such Note became due on
September 1, 1989, Mostrongs never made further application for
financing. (T.72:7-13).

At various times during this two-year

period, Larry Mostrong worked and lived in California. (T.73:2125,T.74:1-7,T.149:13-25,T.150:1-17; Finding No. 18, R. 529).
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19.

On or about

September

1, 1989, Jennifer

Mostrong

informed Jacksons that she had made application for an FHA Loan
through

First

Security

finalized within

four

Bank, which
(4) to six

loan was

expected

(6) weeks.

to

be

As a result,

Jacksons granted Mostrongs an additional three

(3) months in

which to get the FHA financing. (T.284:6-19; Finding No. 19, R.
529).
20.

Mostrongs thereafter informed Jacksons that FHA had

denied their loan request because of a question regarding an
easement to the property. Mostrongs said they needed a "recorded
easement" to the property.

(T.285:3-15, A.[Abstract of Tran-

script] 10 :5-ll; Finding No. 20, R. 529).
21.

Security Title secured a Warranty Deed for the said

north lane from Geraldine Kessler (prior owner of the servient
property) to Jacksons, Jacksons in turn deeded the easement to
Mostrongs. (T. 285:3-15).
1990.

Both deeds were recorded on January 4,

(Exs. 37, 38; Finding No. 21, R. 528-529).

Mostrongs

accepted the easement and remained in possession of the property
until approximately September 25, 1990.
22.

On

December

1,

1989, Jacksons

filed

a Notice

of

Default on the Trust Deed because Mostrongs had failed to make
the balloon payment due on September 1, 1989. (Ex. 10; Finding
No. 22, R. 528).
23.
financing.

Mostrongs

continued

their

efforts

to

obtain

bank

On or about February 12, 1990 Jacksons offered to

carry the financing until March 1, 1990 upon certain conditions
(Ex. 36). Mostrongs declined to accept such conditions. (T.286:
7-17; Finding No. 23, R. 528).
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24.
for April

A Trustee's Sale under the Trust Deed was scheduled
4, 1990.

On or about March

28, 1990, Mostrongs

attempted to procure a temporary restraining order against said
sale.

On or about April 4, 1990, the parties, through their

respective counsel, negotiated an extension of said Trustee's
Sale to May 18, 1990. (T.78:9-14).

On or about May 17, 1990,

Mostrongs paid to Jacksons the sum of $5,257.37 for back monthly
payments agreed upon for Mostrongs to have continued possession
of the property and for attorneys' fees, costs and trustee's fees
and Jacksons extended the time for the Trustee's Sale for an
additional sixty days. (Ex. 27, 28; Finding No. 24, R. 528). All
of the continuations of the Trustee's Sales, were made at the
request of Mostrongs or Mostrongs' legal counsel. (T.271:12-24 ) .
25.

During the interim, Mostrongs negotiated with Valley

Central Bank for a loan to pay off Jacksons' Trust Deed. Valley
Central Bank approved the loan, conditioned upon dedication of
the south lane as a Millard County road and correction of certain
deficiencies

in

construction

of

the house

on

the

property.

(T.119: 9-21; Ex. 18, Finding No. 26, R. 527). The construction
deficiencies were noted by Joseph Stott, an FHA fee appraiser,
who testified that if the deficiencies listed in his appraisal
were corrected, he could see no other problems with the house.
(T.125:21-25,T.126:1-2).
26.

On or about May 3, 1990, Mostrongs obtained a deed

from the owner of the property on which the south access to the
property is located, with delivery conditioned upon acceptance of
said lane as a county road. (Ex. 22; Finding No. 26, R. 527;
T.79:9-11).
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27.

On

or

about

May

15,

1990, Mostrongs

received

a

commitment from the Millard County Commission that Millard County
would accept the south lane as a county road and would agree to
maintain "this new and improved county road" (Exs. 32, 33)- The
Millard County Attorney took a position that such acceptance was
conditioned upon the lane being brought to county standards, (Ex.
20, 21) but the said County Commission resolution did not so
specifically state (Ex. 32, 33). The County Commission chose not
to follow the County Attorney's advise. (T.252:5-13). Mostrongs'
position that conditions were imposed upon them by the County
Commission before acceptance of the road is contrary to the
evidence

(Ex. 32, 33) and contradicts the testimony of their

former legal counsel who testified at trial. (T. 272:16-25,T.273:
11-20,T.274:1-10,15-24 ) .
Roads,

Lee

Roper,

The Millard County Superintendent of

testified

that

he

was

not

contacted

by

Mostrongs (T.208: 1-9) to ascertain what, if any, improvements
were necessary

to bring the lane to county standards.

The

Jacksons refused to contribute in any amount towards such costs.
Nevertheless, Mostrongs submitted the letter of commitment from
Millard County to Valley Central Bank in support of their loan
application. (T.83:19-20; Finding No. 27, R. 527).
28.

Lee Roper further testified that he is not aware of

any county "standards" for the road (T.205:25,T.206:1-10) and
that Millard County had accepted and has quite a few unimproved
roads in the area. (T.208:10-13).
29.

At Jacksons' request, the Millard

County

Building

Official, Jerry Reagan, made an inspection of the home to look at
the structural integrity and give his overall impression of the
13

home. (T.228:2-11; Ex. 19).

Mr. Reagan testified that he used

the 1979 Uniform Building Code ("UBC") as a guide.

He further

testified that the home "looked good" with the exceptions he
noted.

However, the UBC had not been adopted by Millard County

at the time the home was built. (T.228:21-25,T.229:1-2; Finding
No. 28, R. 526, 527).
30.

Carl

Faulkner,

a

licensed

contractor,

called

by

Mostrongs testified that it would cost $6,085.00 to correct the
deficiencies as noted by Mr. Reagan's inspection, and that the
same could be corrected within a couple of days.

Butch Jensen,

a licensed contractor, called by Jacksons, testified that it
would cost $3,212.00

to make the noted repairs (Ex. 47) and that

the same could be done in less than a week.

Jacksons

twice

offered to pay for the cost of fixing any such construction
deficiencies

(Exs. 34, 35;), but no affirmative response was

received from the Mostrongs with respect thereto. (Finding No.
28, R. 526).
31.

After the deed for easement over the south lane and

the commitment from Millard County to accept the same as a county
road were received, and after Jacksons' offers to pay for the
noted deficiencies in the construction of the house,

Mostrongs

took no further steps to secure bank or FHA financing in order to
pay off the Trust Deed Note. (Finding No. 29, R. 526). Jacksons
delayed foreclosure for approximately thirteen months from the
date the Note became due.
32.

Mostrongs made no further payments on the said Trust

Deed Note after May 17, 1990, but remained in possession of the
property. (T.290:17-20).

The property was sold at Trustee's Sale
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on September 25, 1990; Jacksons entered a bid at said sale of
$42,000-00, which bid was accepted.
to Jacksons

A Trustee's Deed was issued

on September 27, 1990. (Ex. 10D; Finding No. 31, R.

525) .
33.

Mostrongs vacated the property on September 25, 1990.

(T.290:12-20) .

Mostrongs did not tender the property back to

Jacksons

to

prior

that

date, nor

did

Mostrongs

notify

the

Jacksons of any intent to repudiate or rescind the purchase of
the property. (T.100:6-19,T.164:23-25,T.165:1-4; Finding No. 32,
R. 525).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement required

Jacksons to convey marketable title as evidenced by a current
policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price or
by an abstract of title brought current, with an attorneys'
opinion.

Security Title issued Mostrongs a policy of title

insurance covering the purchase price of the property.

Such

policy of title insurance insured against lack of right-of-access
to and from the property or unmarketability of title.
Under

the

facts presented

and the Case Law in

support

thereof, the court properly concluded that the property conveyed
by Jacksons to Mostrongs was marketable.
POINT II:

Conveyance

of

financible

property

condition precedent under the contract terms.

was

not

a

The underlying

premise of entering into the contract was that Mostrongs would
establish a two-year residency and income verification in Utah.
The fact that Zions First National Bank informed Mostrongs that
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they would loan Mostrongs the money after the two-year residency/
income requirement shows that the property was financible.
The record is clear that financing was not denied based on
the claims asserted by Mostrongs that there was "lack of access"
to the property and violations of UBC standards regarding the
home.

Financing was initially denied by FHA due to the fact that

the property was not on a public road and due to collection
action.

Financing was initially denied by Valley Central Bank

due to inquiries made of four minor construction deficiencies and
due to collection action.
POINT III; Jacksons always represented legal access to the
property from the north lane. Jackson originally had an easement
by implication from the property to said north lane and Security
Title agreed. Mostrongs have not sustained their burden of proof
to support their claim that Jacksons represented that there was
legal access over the lane running south from the property.
Furthermore, Mostrongs voluntarily obtained an easement on the
south lane which was accepted unconditionally by the Millard
County Commission as a public road.
POINT IV:

Mostrongs

have not established

by

"clear and

convincing evidence" that Jacksons made fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentations
failed

regarding access to the property and have

to establish the elements of fraudulent or negligent

misrepresentation.

Furthermore,

Mostrongs

had

actual

and

constructive notice that the south lane did not have an easement
and

Mostrongs

were

therefore

chargeable

with

notice

of

all

conditions, exceptions or reservations appearing in their chain
of title.
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POINT V:

Mostrongs have not established

by

"clear and

convincing evidence" that Jacksons made fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home.

At the

time the home was built in 1979, Millard County had not yet
adopted

the UBC.

No

final

occupancy

permit was

sought

by

Jacksons when they completed the home as there was no building
inspector employed by Millard County at such time.

Mostrongs

lived in the home approximately three years without raising any
concerns regarding structural deficiencies.
POINT VI:

The

District

Court

correctly

determined

that

there was no material mutual mistake of the parties.
The evidence does not establish that both parties were aware
of a clear bona

fide

mistake regarding material facts as to

access or regarding material facts as to the construction of the
home.

Mostrongs have not proven the elements of mutual mistake.
POINT VII: The

District

Court

correctly

determined

that

there was no material unilateral mistake on the part of the
Mostrongs to support a rescission of the contract of the parties.
Mostrongs fail to carry their burden to establish that there was
a

material

unilateral

mistake

on

their

part.

Furthermore,

Mostrongs have failed to establish the elements of unilateral
mistake.

Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence and

establish

that

the

trial

court's

determination

was

clearly

erroneous.
POINT VIII:

The District Court's determination that bank

refinancing for the money owed to Jacksons under the Note and
Trust Deed was reasonably available to the Mostrongs had they
pursued the matter further, particularly in view of Jacksons'
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willingness to pay for the construction deficiencies noted by the
Millard County Building Official and the lending
appraisers, was not clearly erroneous.

institution

The two problems that

allegedly prohibited Mostrongs from obtaining financing on the
property were 1) having the south lane dedicated as a county road
and 2) correcting four or five minor construction deficiencies
noted by the Valley Central Bank appraiser.
The Millard County Commission unconditionally accepted the
south lane as a county road.

The Jacksons, also unequivocally

represented to the Mostrongs on two occasions that they would pay
for any of the construction deficiencies impeding Mostrongs'
ability to obtain financing from Valley Central Bank.

Although

both of these issues were resolved, Mostrongs never responded to
Jacksons' request to help, nor did they apply for financing once
the apparent impediments were removed.
POINT IX:

The District Court correctly determined that any

rights which Mostrongs may have had to rescission under any
stated facts were waived by Mostrongs failure to promptly notify
Jacksons of Mostrongs' intention to rescind the contract and by
Mostrongs' failure to tender back the property upon Mostrongs
learning of the lack of legal access over the south lane and upon
learning of alleged deficiencies in the construction of the house
located on the property.
Mostrongs retained possession of the property for approximately three years without issuing any complaints as to the
structural

integrity

of

the

home,

voluntarily

procured

an

easement over the south lane, and requested several continuances
of Trustee's Sales in order to proceed with financing.
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Mostrongs

never attempted to rescind the contract nor did they tender the
property back to the Jacksons.

Mostrongs' representations and

conduct are inconsistent with their claim for rescission.
POINT X:

The

District

Court

correctly

determined

that

neither party has shown a legal basis to support a claim for
attorneys' fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY CONVEYED BY JACKSONS BY WARRANTY DEED TO MOSTRONGS
ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 1, 1987, WAS MARKETABLE.
Mostrongs' assertion that Jacksons did not convey marketable

title is against the clear weight of evidence produced at trial.
The parties entered into an arms length transaction, whereby
Mostrongs

agreed

to

purchase

the

property

for

$65,000.00.

(T.63:15-20,T.64:23-25,T.65:1-12; Finding No. 8, R. 532). On July
15, 1987, the parties entered into an integrated Earnest Money
Agreement reciting the $65,000.00 purchase price.
Mostrongs were informed by Zions First National Bank that
they could not obtain long-term financing on the basis that Larry
Mostrong was self-employed and had not resided in Utah for a
sufficient time to establish his income.

Jacksons agreed to

carry the financing on the property for two years to allow the
Mostrongs to establish a sufficient income history and residency
in Utah so as to satisfy the bank's lending requirements for
financing. (T.32:7-12).
Therefore,

the

parties

entered

into

an

Earnest

Money

Agreement on July 15, 1987, for the sale and purchase of the
property.

On September 1, 1987, the parties held a closing

memorialized by a Warranty Deed, a Trust Deed Note and a Trust
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Deed. (Finding No. 14, R. 530, 531).
the closing.

Security Title conducted

Jacksons conveyed by Warranty Deed and Mostrongs

accepted only that property described as follows:
The South half of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 22,
Township 21 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Excepting therefrom k of all oil, gas and other
minerals in on or under said land, together with the
right of ingress and egress for the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same.
Together with that certain underground water well
identified as: Water User's Claim No. 67-885, Application No. 5342, Certificate No. 12844.
Together with all improvements
thereunto belonging.

and

appurtenances

Subject
to
covenants, conditions, restrictions,
reservations, rights of way and easements in existence
and/or of record.(emphasis added)
Said conveyance did not specifically include any easement
for access from the north or the south. (Ex. 4; Finding No. 15,
R. 530).
Paragraph

3

of

the

Earnest

Money

Agreement

entitled

"Condition and Conveyance of Title" states in pertinent part:
Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable
title to the property, subject to encumbrances and
exceptions noted herein, evidenced by a current policy
of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price
[or] 2 an abstract of title brought current, with an
attorney's opinion...(Addendum A)
Security Title issued to Mostrongs and Mostrongs accepted a
policy of title insurance covering the purchase price of the

2

The Earnest Money Agreement contains a space with an
accompanying box • located prior to seller's choice of conveying
marketable title, evidenced by a policy of title insurance or an
abstract of title. Jacksons conveyed marketable title, evidenced
by a policy of title insurance.
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property. (Ex. 14; Addendum B ) . The cover sheet of the Policy of
Title Insurance states in pertinent part:
...[F]irst
American
Title
Insurance
Company
a
California Corporation, herein called the Company,
insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A,
against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of
insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys'
fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the
Insured by reason of:
1.
Title to the Estate or Interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than is stated herein;
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance
of such title;
3. Lack of a right-of-access to and from
the land; or
4.
Unmarketability
of
such title.
(empha sis added)
It is well established that:
" . . .marketable title must be free from reasonable
doubt...[T]he test is not whether title ultimately
might be adjudged free of defects.
Rather, it is
"whether a reasonable prudent [person], familiar with
the facts and apprised of the question of law involved,
would accept the title in the ordinary course of
business." Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur D'Alene, Ltd.,
Ill Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065, (1986) and that "to
render a title unmarketable, the defect must present a
real and substantial probability of litigation or loss.
Frank Towers Corp. v. Laviana, 97 A.2d 567, 571 (1953).
The trial

court

could

determine

that Jacksons

conveyed

marketable title to Mostrongs, based on the findings and the
record that Mostrongs inspected the property on several occasions
prior to entering into the Earnest Money Agreement (T.133:7-9);
that Mostrongs accepted the property pursuant to the terms of the
Earnest Money Agreement; that Mostrongs received a policy of
title insurance that insured against "lack of a right-of-access
to and from the land" and "unmarketability of title"; and that
Larry Mostrong was familiar with legal descriptions and read the
legal description on the Warranty Deed he received from Jacksons
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at closing. (T.160:1-9).

Furthermore, it is reasonable that a

person who was

could

told

he

obtain

bank

financing

on

the

property after establishing a two-year residency/income requirement would purchase the property.
Jurisdictions under similar facts as those presented to the
trial court, have made a distinction as to the manner in which
the seller's conveyance of marketable title is deemed sufficient.
In Holmby, Inc. v. Pino, 647 P. 2d 392 (1982) the Supreme
Court

of

Nevada

considered

whether

the

encumbrance

on

the

property evidenced by a Trust Deed, which was made known to the
buyer after execution of a sales document, disabled the seller
from conveying marketable title.
specific

performance,

the

Court

In refusing to grant the buyer
stated

that..."[T]here

was

undisputed evidence that Dino [seller] would have been able to
tender marketable title.

The sales agreement provided that a

Title Insurance Policy would serve as evidence of marketable
title." Holmby, Inc. v. Pino, 647 P.2d 392, 394 (1982)(emphasis
added).

Courts in other jurisdictions which have addressed this

issue have also similarly held. See e.g. , Love v. Fetters, 121 A.
607 Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey (1923); Korb v.
Spray Beach Hotel Co,, 24 N.J. Super. 151, 93 A.2d 578, 581
(1952) .
Under these facts the trial court properly concluded that
the property conveyed by Jacksons to Mostrongs was marketable.
II.

CONVEYANCE OF "FINANCIBLE" PROPERTY WAS NOT A CONDITION
PRECEDENT UNDER THE CONTRACT TERMS.
NEVERTHELESS, THE
EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT THE PROPERTY CONVEYED FROM JACKSONS
TO MOSTRONGS WAS "FINANCIBLE".
A.

Conveyance Of Financible Property Was Not A Condition
Precedent To The Contract.
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Mostrongs' allegations that the underlying premise of the
parties'

contract

was

that

the property

was

financible

and

therefore was a condition precedent to Mostrongs' contractual
obligations,

is

without

merit.

In

fact, the

trial

court

specifically found that:
[a]11 parties reasonably believed at the time of
closing that the only apparent obstacle to bank
financing was the two-year residency for verification
of Plaintiffs' income. The parties therefore agreed in
order to give Plaintiffs time to accomplish the
intended FHA or other acceptable financing to enter
into said Note and Trust Deed as an interim measure, (rinding No. 17, R. 529-530)
The underlying premise of entering into the contract was not
that the property was financible, but that the Mostrongs would
establish a two-year residency and income verification in the
State of Utah. (Finding No. 13, R. 531). This is further established by the testimony given by the parties in this action.
(T.28:8-20,T.30:9-17,T.313:9-15).

Zions

First

National

Bank

would have financed the property but for Larry Mostrong's failure
to establish a sufficient income history in Utah (T.71:8-19;
Finding

No.

13, R.

531) this

shows

the

property

was

both

marketable and financible.
Finally,

neither

the

Earnest

Money

Agreement

(Ex.

1;

Addendum A ) , nor the Trust Deed Note (Ex. 4) impose any condition
precedent regarding "financibility" of the property.

This is

further borne out by the testimony of LeeRoy Jackson. (T.282:715,T.283:l-8,T.312:13-25,T.313:l-8).
B.

The Financial Institutions Did Not Deny Mostrongs
Financing Due To "Lack Of Access" To The Property, Or
For Failure to Comply With UBC Standards Regarding The
Home'8 Construction,
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Mostrongs' assertion that the record is clear that Jacksons
did not convey financible title [property] is without merit.
Mostrongs failed to cite any part of the record in support of
such

assertion, but

only

suggest

that

financing

was

denied

because of lack of access to the property and that the home's
construction was substandard.
1.

Access;

FHA's denial of Mostrongs' loan application (Ex. 7) does not
say financing was denied because of "lack of access", it was
denied due to the fact that it was not located on a "public
maintained road".

This was confirmed by both Linda Whiteman,

First Security Bank Loan Officer and an FHA appraiser

Steve

Hatch. (A.29:24-25,A.33:12-16,A.34:4-7,T.213:21-25,T.214:1-3).
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there is no
similar requirement
clear

by

property.

Steve

for a conventional loan.3

Hatch, who

conducted

two

This was made

appraisals

on

the

After referring to the requirement that the property

must be located on a public road for FHA purposes, Steve Hatch
testified that for conventional loan purposes "...it's not up to
me to reject or not reject it as far as that conventional loan."
(T.213:21-24,T.214:1-5) .
That the alleged access problem was not even a consideration
when Mostrongs applied for conventional financing through Valley
Central Bank, is evidenced by the testimony of Judy Hardinger,
Loan Officer of Valley Central Bank. (A.41:12-25,A.42:1-6).
3

Mostrongs' argument assumes FHA was the only financing
available. This is contrary to the terms of the Earnest Money
Agreement.
The only other application made by Mostrongs to
Valley Central Bank was a conventional loan.
24

2.
Mostrongs

UBC Standards:
second

assertion

that

the property was

"non-

financible" is based on the allegation that the home's construction was not in compliance with UBC standards.

Again, Mostrongs

fail to cite to the record to support such allegation.

In fact,

no where in the entire record has it been established

that

Mostrongs were denied financing due to the home being constructed
in violation of the UBC.
FHA denied Mostrongs' loan application for two reasons: 1)
the property was not on a public road (A. 33:12-16) and 2) for
collection action (Ex. 7 ) .
even raised by FHA.

Construction deficiencies were not

In fact, Steve Hatch testified that he saw

no structural problems with the house that would make FHA reject
the loan application. (T.219:21-25,T.220:1-8).
Valley Central Bank also denied Mostrongs' loan application
for two reasons: 1) inquiries made of four minor construction
deficiencies (Ex. 18) and 2) collection action (Ex. 17).
Loan Officer Judy Hardinger testified that the only reason
the loan application was denied was based on appraiser Joseph
Stott's

references

to construction

A.49:5-11,A.47:21-25,A.48:1-4).

deficiencies.

Furthermore,

(A.41:6-18,

Judy

Hardinger

testified that the question regarding access to the property was
not an issue. (A.41:25,A.42:1-6).
Joseph Stott, who conducted an appraisal for Valley Central
Bank, testified that he uses UBC standards and standards set by
FHA when inspecting a home, and that he is familiar enough with
those standards to make a judgment call as to the construction of
a home. (T.124:12-15,T.122:7-16). When asked whether Jacksons or
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Mostrongs would have to bring up the noted deficiencies to UBC
standards, Stott testified:
What the lenders ask us to do is go out and to
indicate any deficiencies or problems in the home, and
we put that on the appraisal. And when that lender or
underwriter reviews that, they can require that those
be brought up to those standards, if they so desire,
(emphasis added)(T.124:16-23).
Steve Hatch's testimony is consistent.

When asked if every

home he inspected had to meet building code inspection, Hatch
testified:
No. If it's something obvious and merely deficient of course appraisers aren't inspectors per se, we
are for value; but there's most houses in our county,
community, whatever, financed somewhere and obviously
the older ones may not meet the most up-to-date codes
but still, if they are reasonably accepted market, they
are in fact financed. (T.220:17-25).
It is also interesting to note that the collection matters
raised by Valley Central Bank, were taken care of by Mostrongs
approximately two months after Mostrongs' loan had been denied.
(A.46:22-25,A.47:1-14; Ex. 29, 31). Mostrongs did not return to
apply for financing with Valley Central Bank after correcting
those concerns raised (A.48:2-4), even though a determination for
financing could have been made in less than a month. (A.48:5-12).
Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of
their allegation that the property was not financible. Doelle v.
Bradley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (1989), and that the findings
of the trial court were "clearly erroneous". Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a).
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT LEGAL ACCESS
FROM THE PROPERTY TO A PUBLIC ROAD WAS REPRESENTED BY THE
JACKSONS TO BE ALONG THE LANE RUNNING NORTH FROM SAID
PROPERTY AND MOSTRONGS HAVE NOT SUSTAINED THEIR BURDEN OF
PROOF TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM THAT JACKSONS REPRESENTED THAT
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THERE WAS LEGAL ACCESS OVER THE LANE RUNNING SOUTH FROM THE
PROPERTY.
The testimony clearly establishes that Jacksons represented
legal access to the property to the lane running north to a
public road, while consistently representing the south road to be
built by permission and use for convenience only.4 (T.281:27,T.245:4-9,T.239:2-9,T.240:12-25,T.241:1-2).

At no time did

Mostrongs testify that Jacksons represented to have an "easement"
on the south road.
A.

At the Time Jacksons Purchased The Property# The Only
Access To The Property Was Over The North Lane
Connecting Jacksons' Property To A County Road;
Jacksons Initially Had An Easement By Implication When
They Purchased The Property, And Later Acquired A
"Recorded Easement" To Said North Lane.

Prior to Mrs. Geraldine Kessler selling LeeRoy and William
Jackson the property at issue, Mrs. Kessler owned the entire
tract of land including Jacksons' property, located approximately
3/4 of a mile north to a public road. (A.15:5-25). LeeRoy and

A

The District Court determined in Finding No. 9, R. 532,
that the evidence did not preponderate in support of Mostrongs'
claim with respect to the south lane. Mostrongs cite portions of
the transcript to establish that LeeRoy Jackson's testimony was
contradictory on this point; that Jackson testified that he told
Larry Mostrong that he had a legal easement to the south road
(T.245) and then denied that he told him that he had an easement
on that road. (T.280-281).
However, when reading the entire
portion of the transcript cited by Mostrongs, LeeRoy Jackson
immediately clarified his statement regarding an easement to the
south lane. Jackson testifies that "I told them I had put the
road in, I had permission to use the road for convenience". (See
T.281:2-7;T.245:4-9 ) In at least five separate incidents LeeRoy
Jackson testified that he built the south lane by permission of
the previous landowner and used the property for "private use",
or "personal use only" (emphasis added) (See T.239:2-9;T.240:1219 Citing Jackson Deposition T.240: 23-25;T.241:1-2;T.245:49;T.281:2-7)
Nowhere in the trial transcript have Mostrongs
testified themselves that LeeRoy Jackson represented to them that
he had an "easement" on the south road.
The great weight of
evidence supports the trial court's finding.
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William Jackson were the first purchasers of a lot located within
said tract of land.
In Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246 (1979), the Supreme Court
set forth the elements of an easement by implication as follows:
1) A previous unity of title; 2) followed by a severance; 3) that at the time of the severance the servitude was
so plainly apparent that any prudent observer should have
been aware of it; 4) that the easement is reasonably
necessary to the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate;
and 5) it must have been continuous, at least in the sense
that it is used by the possessor whenever he desires.
Such an easement would run to the benefit of Jacksons upon
conveyance of the property.
It has been established that there was a previous unity of
title by Mrs. Kessler

(A.15:5-25); followed by a severance -

Jacksons being the first to purchase a parcel of the undivided
tract

(Ex.

50).

Furthermore, when

Mrs. Kessler

sold

said

property to Jacksons, the road was plainly apparent to anyone who
would have observed or made an inspection of the property.

As

the road was the only access to the Jacksons' property, the
easement was not only reasonably necessary, but was imperative to
the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate and the use of said
road was continuous by Jacksons, as it was the only access to
their property.
The Vice-President

and Manager

of

Security

Title, Kent

Dalton, testified that he felt that there was an easement at law
or an implied easement to the property, based on work he had
previously done on said property; and that "it was the intention
that there was an implied easement to the north". (A.8:4-11). In
any event, once Security Title recorded said Warranty Deeds for
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an easement to the north lane (Exs. 37, 41), it effectively cured
any question regarding the "recorded easement" requested by FHA.
Regardless of whether Jacksons had an easement by implication, it has been shown that Mrs. Kessler conveyed the property
to the individual property owners "TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO
a 33 foot easement over and across the east 33 feet of said
property

for

road

and

utility

original) (Addendum C; Ex. 51).

purposes".(emphasis

in

the

The law is well established in

this State that "if a conveyance contains a reservation, the
entire

property

or estate

described

passes

to

the grantee,

subject to the right, estate or easement reserved..••" (emphasis
added) Burton v. United States, 29 Utah 2d 226, 507 P.2d 710, 712
(Utah

1973).

Furthermore, Utah

Courts

have

recognized

the

principle that "'In construing instruments creating easements in
land, the Court will look to the circumstances attending the
transaction,

situation

of

the

parties,

the

state

of

thing

granted, and the object to be obtained, to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the parties'". Stevens v. Bird-Jex
Co. , 18 P.2d

292, 294 (Utah 1933)(Citing Kirkham v. Sharp, 1

Whart. (Pa.) 323, 29 an. dec. 59; Green v. Canny, 137 Mass. 64;
Adney v. Twonbly, 39 R.I. 304, 97 A. 806; Thomson v. Germania L.
Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 89, 106 N.W. 102).
The Stevens Court indicated that there was nothing in the
language

of the deed

"...to indicate an

intention

that

the

grantee was to have the exclusive use of the property over which
the easement was created".Stevens, Id..

In the Stevens case, the

Court refused to consider the issue as to whether the rights of
the servient owner would be subordinate to those of the dominant
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owner, due to the fact that the owners of the dominant estate
".•.have not in any manner been hindered or obstructed in the
enjoyment of the easement..." (Stevens, 292 at 295).
Mostrongs' argued that the District Court did not address
the issue of whether the deeds purporting to grant an easement
over the north lane successfully conveyed this easement. This is
contrary to the testimony and evidence presented at trial.
After all of the deeds from Kessler to the various property
owners north of the Jackson property were submitted, the trial
court

specifically

asked Mostrongs

expert witness, Wayne

M.

Pinder, Jr., owner and president of Provo Land Title Company,
whether all the deeds contained the language "subject to a rightof-way" .

Mr. Pinder responded,

"They do". (T.350:6-9).

In

clarification of this issue, the trial court a second time asked
Mr. Pinder whether "all the deeds [are up the chain or] up the
lane contain the language 'together with and subject to a rightof-way'".

Again the witness testified, "Right." (T.350:22-25 ) .

The Court also pointed out that no one had ever prevented
the Jacksons or the Mostrongs from travelling over the north lane
to get to the public road. (T.335:16-21) .

Finally, Mostrongs'

argument

the

regarding

the

insurability

easements (Ex. 37, 41) is misplaced.

of

Warranty

Deed

The District Court aptly

points out that Security Title had already issued Mostrongs a
policy of title insurance insuring against lack of access to the
property. (T.334:10-25,T.335:1-7).
Again, Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the District Court's findings and demonstrate that the
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evidence supporting the findings is "clearly erroneous". Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a).
B.

Mostrongs Have Not Sustained Their Burden Of Proof To
Support Their Claim That The Lane Running South Of The
Property Was The Barqained-For Access,

In support of its findings, the District Court determined
that 1) Larry Mostrong inspected the property on at least three
occasions prior to entering into the Earnest Money Agreement and
that the parties agreed that the north lane and south lane were
discussed on these occasions

(Finding No. 9, R. 532); 2) the

parties had further discussions on those occasions when they
talked about the access road and maintenance of the access road
(T.133:7-15);

3)

[Mostrongs] needed

Mostrongs
a

informed

"deeded"

Jacksons

easement

over

that

the north

they
lane

(T.285:3-7); 4) when Mostrongs made inquiry to Jacksons regarding
a

"recorded

easement" to the north

lane, Jacksons

contacted

Security Title Company, who secured a Warranty Deed easements for
the north

lane

from Geraldine

Kessler,

(prior owner of

the

servient property) which deeds were recorded on January 4, 1990
in the Millard County Recorder's Office. (Finding No. 21, R. 528,
529; Ex. 37, 41); and 5) Jacksons testified that they informed
Mostrongs

that

the north

lane was

the

legal

access

to

the

property and that the south lane was for convenience only and was
only a permissive use. (T.280:22-25,T.281:1-3; Finding No. 9, R.
532) .
Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of
their

assertion

property.

that

the

south

lane

was

the

bargained-for

Such finding is not clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P.

52(a).
31

C.

Mostrongs Voluntarily Obtained An Easement
South Lane,

On The

A series of continuances of the pending Trustee's Sale on
the property were made in order to give Mostrongs additional time
to obtain

an easement

on the

south

lane

in

furtherance

of

financing. (T.85:8-22,T.78:9-17; Finding No. 24, R. 528). The
record shows that such continuances were made at the request of
Mostrongs. (T.275:4-16).
Accordingly, Mostrongs obtained an easement on the south
lane at no cost.

(T. 79:4-11).

The easement given by a Mr.

Tuckfield to the Mostrongs was accompanied by a letter making
conveyance

of

the

easement

conditional

on

Millard

County's

acceptance of the south lane as a public road (Ex. 22). Millard
County

accepted

conditions

to

the

such

road

outright,

acceptance

(Exs.

without

attaching

32, 33).

any

Thereafter,

Mostrongs' previous attorney gave the easement to the Millard
County Attorney, who held

the deed awaiting

record same. (T.250:12-17 ) .

instructions

to

When Mostrongs failed to request

recordation of the deed, it was returned to Mostrongs' current
attorney.

At this particular point in time, Mostrongs could

easily have obtained financing through FHA.
1.

Mostrongs Allegations That The Cost Associated
With Millard County Accepting Said South Lane
Was Prohibitive, Is Against the Credible Weight
Of Evidence.

Mostrongs make allegations, unsupported by the record, and
against the great weight of evidence, that the Millard County
Commission imposed "conditions" in accepting the south lane as a
county road.

32

Jennifer Mostrong testified that Millard County would only
accept the south lane if brought up to county standards. (T.79:
12-25,T.80:1-5). This is contrary to the testimony of Mostrongs'
former attorney, who testified that no conditions were imposed.
(T.272:16-25,T.273:1-25,T.274:1-25). It is also contrary to the
County Commission Resolution (Finding No. 27, R. 527; Ex. 42) and
contrary to an official letter delivered to Mostrongs by the
Millard

County Commission, whereby Millard

County agreed

to

accept and maintain the road to the property as a county road.
(T.81:19-25,T.82:1-25,T.83:1-9; Ex. 32).
Jennifer Mostrong further testified that she contacted Lee
Roper,

Millard

specifications
thereafter
quote.
that

County

Road

for the south

contacted

Reed

had

to

install

lane

to

a

contractor,

Larry Mostrong
cattle

determine

county

(T. 80:13-24) and that she

Penney, general

(T.80:25,T.81:1-2).5

he

Supervisor,

guard

for a

further testified

and

culvert

at

an

exorbitant expense, in order to meet the county road standards.
However, when asked who told him that county standards warranted
the installation of a cattle guard and culvert, Larry Mostrong
testified that M[n]obody told me to do it." (T.165:12-16).
Millard
denied

ever

(T.208:1-9).

County Road

Supervisor, Lee Roper, emphatically

talking

Jennifer

to

Mostrong

or

Reed

Penney.

Furthermore, Lee Roper's testimony was unrebutted

that he has no documentation that shows "standards" for a county
road that the Millard County Commission would accept (T.205:25,
3

Reed Penney testified that he could not remember who he
talked to to obtain the specs from the County as it was "three or
four years ago". (T.204:20-25) He further testified that he did
not inspect the road prior to entering his bid. (T.205:1-4)
33

T.206:1-9) and that Millard County has accepted and has quite a
few

similar

unimproved

roads

in

the

area.

(T.208:10-13).

Finally, Lee Roper testified that he does not know anything about
having to install cattle guards. (T.209:8-10).
Mostrongs'

allegations

that

the

south

lane

was

the

"bargained-for" access to the property is inconsistent with their
conduct in obtaining an easement over the south property.
Mostrongs never testified that Jacksons represented to them
that they had an "easement" on the south road.

Furthermore,

Jacksons never retracted their position that the south road was
built by permission for their use and convenience and that they
were not obligated to seek an easement on the south road (Ex.15).
The

evidence

is

unrebutted

that

Jacksons

made

several

continuances of the Trustee's Sale at Mostrongs' request to allow
the Mostrongs the opportunity to obtain said easement to the
south lane. (T.78:9-12,T.271:12-24,T.286:18-22).
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT JACKSONS DID
NOT MAKE ANY FRAUDULENT OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS TO
MOSTRONGS REGARDING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY, AND SUCH FINDING
IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The District Court correctly determined that Jacksons did

not make fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations to Mostrongs
regarding access to the property.

Mostrongs have not met their

burden, either before the trial court or on appeal that Jacksons
made fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations.

Such proof is

to be established by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air
Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, Inc., 226 Kan. 70, 596
P.2d 816, 824 (1979) .
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A.

Mostrongs Have Not Established the Elements of Fraudulent Or Negligent Misrepresentation Regarding Access
To The Property.

Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence to establish
that Jacksons made fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations
regarding access to the property.
This Court has defined the elements of fraud as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(7)
(8)

That a representation was made;
Concerning a presently existing material fact;
Which was false;
Which the representor either
a) Knew to be false, or
b) Made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation;
For the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it;
That the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity,
Did in fact rely upon it;
And was thereby induced to act;

(9)

To his injury or damage.

(5)
(6)

Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P. 2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App.
1990WCiting Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273
(1952).
In arguing against the findings of the trial court and
attempting to show that the elements of fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation exist, Mostrongs fail to cite to the record to
support

their

claims

against

the

trial

court's

findings.

Mostrongs reargue the facts most favorable to their position and
ignore the District Court's findings supported by the record.
In their Brief, Mostrongs fail to address elements 2, 3, 7
and 8 in the aforementioned definition of fraud.
The only arguments advanced by Mostrongs are 1) that the
factual

findings

of

the

trial

court

indicate

that

Jacksons

represented to Mostrongs that the north lane was the legal access
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to the property and the south lane was a private road which was
permissibly used and which would be there always.

In addition,

Mostrongs state that LeeRoy Jackson told Larry Mostrong that he
had a legal easement to the south road (See fn.4) and that the
construction of the house was FHA approved.
Larry Mostrong testified that LeeRoy Jackson stated that the
construction of the home was "FHA approvable" and then contradicted himself stating that LeeRoy Jackson represented construction of the house was

"FHA approved",

(T.151:6-12).

LeeRoy

Jackson testified that he represented to Mostrongs that he had
built the home himself and that he made no other representations
regarding the construction of the home. (T.280:15-20) .
In response to Mostrongs' argument that Jacksons induced the
Mostrongs to purchase the property, the trial court found that
Larry Mostrong initially offered LeeRoy Jackson $55,000.00 for
the property but that LeeRoy Jackson specifically informed Larry
Mostrong

that he would not sell the property

$65,000.00

and

that Mostrongs

thereafter

for less than

agreed

to pay

the

$65,000.00 purchase price. (Finding No. 8, R. 532).
All

other

arguments

made

by Mostrongs

as

to Jacksons'

alleged fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations were addressed
and

disposed

regarding

of

earlier,

with

the

exception

of

the

issue

the condition of the home which will be addressed

hereafter.
Finally,

in

response

to

Mostrongs'

assertion

that

the

court's reliance on certain testimony proffered by Jacksons to
support their [Jacksons'] contention that they made no material
misrepresentation of fact is misplaced (Appellants' Brief P. 37).
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Mostrongs, not Jacksons, must prove such fraud or negligent
misrepresentation by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air
Conditioning, Inc., at 816, 824.
B.

The
purchased

Mostrongs Had Actual and Constructive Notice That The
South Lane Did Not Have An Easement And Were Therefore
Chargeable With Notice Of All Conditions. Exceptions
or Reservations Appearing In Their Chain Of Title,
record
other

establishes
properties

that
besides

Mostrongs
the

had

previously

property

in

issue.

(T.157:6-11,T.34:7-19). When asked if he had previous opportunities to read legal descriptions, Larry Mostrong answered "Yes."
(T.161:1-3)

Apparently, Larry Mostrong was extremely concerned

regarding the access to the property (T.133:7-15) and testified
that on the day of closing

he had opportunity

to read the

description on the warranty deed he received from the Jacksons.
In light of the aforementioned

facts, Mostrongs took no

further action to ascertain the status of an easement to the
south road.
The law is well established that M'[a] purchaser is not only
charged with notice of the contents of the deeds of his chain of
title but, if the same contain anything that would put a prudent
man upon inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of whatever an
inquiry would reveal.'" Haves v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah
1946)(Citing Wilkerson v. Ward, Tex. Civ. App., 137 S.W. 158).
Mostrongs knew from the language of the Warranty Deed, which
they claim to have read at closing (T.161:1-6,T.33:4-12), that
the Warranty Deed did not specifically call out an easement to
the south

lane.

Mostrongs are charged with notice of

"the

contents" of the deeds of their chain of title, and as such,
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Mostrongs could have ascertained

that there was not a legal

easement south of the property.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT JACKSONS DID NOT
MAKE ANY FRAUDULENT OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS TO
MOSTRONGS REGARDING THE CONDITION OF THE HOME AND SUCH
FINDING IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Mostrongs only allegations that Jacksons fraudulently or

negligently misrepresented the condition of the home were based
on Larry Mostrong's testimony that LeeRoy Jackson represented
that the house construction was FHA approved and that

since

LeeRoy Jackson built the home he knew or should have known that
the house did not conform to UBC standards.
As with Mostrongs previous argument that Jacksons fraudulently and negligently misrepresented the issue regarding access
to the property, Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence
and cite the record supporting their claims.
When Jacksons constructed the home on said property in 1979,
the UBC was not in effect in Millard County.

The UBC was not

adopted by Millard County until March of 1981 (Ex. 42). On July
18, 1979, a building permit was issued by Millard County to
Jacksons.

No final occupancy permit was sought by the Jacksons

upon completion of the home as there was no building inspector
employed by Millard County at such time. (T.225:1-25,T.244:9-15;
Finding No. 5, R. 533).
Jacksons construction of the home could not have conformed
to the UBC for the simple fact that the UBC requires a final
inspection

and

issuance

of

a

final

occupancy

permit.

As

established at trial, Jacksons could get neither, as Millard
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County had not as of that date employed a building inspector.
(T.225:2-25).
As further pointed out above, Larry Mostrong's testimony
that LeeRoy Jackson represented the home to be FHA approvable
(T.151:6-10) is antithetical to LeeRoy Jackson's testimony that
the only

representation

he made was that he had actually

constructed the house. (T.280:15-20).
Larry Mostrong testified that he inspected the home prior to
purchase (T.151:4-5); that he signed an Earnest Money Agreement
accepting the home in its present physical condition (T.151:2125,T.152:1-5) ; and that he did not enlist the help of a building
inspector prior to purchase. (T.152:6-9).
Nevertheless, Mostrongs resided in the home for approximately three years without any apparent difficulties with the
structure or improvements.
The cases cited by Appellants in support of this argument
are inapposite. (Appellants' Brief P. 30). In each such case the
prospective buyer was denied financing for "insufficient income".
Mostrongs have not established

fraudulent or negligent

misrepresentation by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air
Conditioning, Inc., at 816, 824.
VI.

MOSTRONGS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF THE PARTIES REGARDING ACCESS TO THE
PROPERTY OR CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOME.
Mutual mistake requires that "...there is a clear bona

fide

mistake regarding material facts, without culpable negligence on
the part of the person complaining...." Davie v. Brownson, 3
Wash. App. 820, 478 P. 2d 258, 260 (1970) (Citing Lindberq v.
Murray, 177 Wash. 43, 201 P.2d 759, 763 (1921)).
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A party claiming mutual mistake must show that the mistake
involved a "material fact" and "without culpable negligence" on
the part of the person complaining. Davie, at 260.
The

trial

court

determined

that

"[N]o

material

mutual

mistake of the parties has been shown by the evidence adduced by
[Mostrongs]." (Conclusion No. 8, R. 523)
Mostrongs suggest that there were clear bona
regarding

material

facts

as

they

related

property and construction of the property.
access has been addressed.

to

fide

mistakes

access

to

the

The issue regarding

The District Court found sufficient

evidence to establish that there was proper legal access to the
north

lane.

Furthermore,

Mostrongs

had

possession

of

the

property for approximately three years and obtained an easement
to the south lane.
Mostrongs assertion that there were mutual mistakes of fact
regarding construction of the home, has no merit.

Financing was

never denied because the home did not comply with UBC standards,
it was denied

because

the FHA appraiser, Joseph

Stott, was

concerned about three or four construction items on the property.
(T.119:5-16; Ex. 18). Mr. Stott testified that in jurisdictions
that had not adopted building codes, FHA has its own standards.
Mr. Stott further testified that had the items he checked on his
appraisal been corrected, there was nothing else he saw that
would have been a problem. (T.125:2-25,T.126:1-2 ) •
There was no material mutual mistake of the parties that the
home was built strictly in accordance with the UBC, due to the
fact that such alleged noncompliance with the UBC had absolutely
no bearing on Mostrongs' ability to obtain financing.
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In June of

1991, Mostrongs hired a building inspector, Charles V. Hugo, and
a contractor, Carl Faulkner, to inspect the property and estimate
costs of construction problems.6 (T.177:17-23). When asked which
UBC manual he used during his inspection of the home, Mr. Hugo
testified, "I didn't have a manual in my hand.

I was going by

past experience as an inspector and looking for, not necessarily
code violations, but problems." (T.181:2-10) . Mostrongs raised
the issue regarding the UBC, after the fact, only in furtherance
of their lawsuit.
It may be expected that homes that are constructed in a
jurisdiction that have not adopted the UBC may well have some
construction deficiencies.
appraiser with
whether

22 years

all homes

However, Steve Hatch, a real estate
experience

he inspects would

(T.211:4-18), when
have

to meet

asked

the UBC,

testified, "No...obviously the older ones may not meet the most
up-to-date

codes but still, if they are reasonably

accepted

market/ they are in fact financed."(emphasis added)(T.220:17-25).
Mostrongs did not meet their burden in trial court that
there was a material mutual mistake of the parties, nor have they
marshaled the evidence on this appeal to challenge the Court's
determination.

It is well established that:

6

Timely objection (T.186:9-12) was made on the grounds of
relevancy on Mr Hugo's and Mr. Faulkner's testimony based on the
fact that financing was not denied on account of the UBC
violations and that the cost of correcting the items set forth in
such inspection exceeded the cost of those items addressed by
Valley Central Bank as listed in the Stott Appraisal. (Ex. 18)
Furthermore, Faulkner's estimate of corrections was approximately
twice the amount testified to by Butch Jensen.
Faulkner
testified that he did not have experience as a building inspector, but that he took a "punch list" evaluating what he felt were
inadequacies with regard to the home. (T.195:10-23)
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[t]he Appellant must marshal all the evidence
which supports the trial court's findings and show
that, in the light most favorable to the finding, it is
against the "clear weight of the evidence", and is thus
clearly erroneous when applied to the foregoing legal
principles.
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT MOSTRONGS HAVE
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL UNILATERAL
MISTAKE ON THEIR PART TO SUPPORT A RESCISSION OF THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
Utah Courts have defined unilateral mistake as consisting of
the following elements:
1)

The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to
enforce
the
contract
as
actually
made
would
unconscionable.
The matter as to which the mistake was made must
relate to a material feature of the contract.
Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party
making the mistake.
It must be possible to give relief by way of rescission without serious prejudice to the other party
except the loss of his bargain. In other words, it
must be possible to put him in status
quo.

2)
3)
4)

Mostrongs have not established that there was a mistake of
"so grave a consequence" that to enforce the contract as actually
made would be unconscionable, nor have Mostrongs established that
there was a mistake of a "material" feature of the contract.
The contract entered into by the parties was that Mostrongs
would receive financing to pay off the Note at the end of two
years.

Financing was never denied because of "lack of legal

access" and

"structural defects of the house", as alleged by

Mostrongs.
The evidence has been established

that there was

legal

access to the north lane and that the Mostrongs were on notice as
to legal access to the south lane.
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It has also been shown that

the construction of the home had no bearing on Mostrongs' ability
to obtain financing.
Finally,

Jacksons would

be

seriously

prejudiced

by a

rescission of the contract, based on the extended time they gave
Mostrongs to obtain financing, Mostrongs' continuous occupation
of the property, Jacksons' lost rent and subsequent expenses in
restoring the property.
It is evident from the arguments made above, that there was
not a material mistake regarding financing, lack of access or
material structural defects of the home.
Mostrongs

do

nothing

more

presented at the trial court.

than

re-argue

the

case as

It is not Jacksons' place to

marshal the evidence to support the Court's finding and conclusion that there was no material unilateral mistake on the part of
Mostrongs sufficient to support a rescission.
VIII.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BANK
REFINANCING FOR MONEY OWED TO JACKSONS UNDER THE NOTE
AND TRUST DEED WAS REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO MOSTRONGS
HAD THEY PURSUED THE MATTER FURTHER, PARTICULARLY IN
VIEW OF JACKSONS' WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES NOTED BY THE MILLARD COUNTY BUILDING
OFFICIAL AND THE LENDING INSTITUTION APPRAISERS.

A.

Mostrongs' Acquisition Of An Easement Over The South
Lane Of The Property And Jacksons' Willingness To
Correct The Construction Deficiencies, Guaranteed
Mostrongs Financing.

The trial court found that the Mostrongs submitted the
Millard County commitment to Valley Central Bank in support of
their loan application and testimony is unrebutted that access
was no longer an issue to financing. (T.41:25/T.42:1-11).
It has been shown that Valley Central Bank's refusal to
accept

the loan application was due to those
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construction

deficiencies noted on Joseph Stott's appraisal.

It has been

established that the UBC was not in existence in Millard County
when Jacksons constructed the home and that neither Mostrongs or
Jacksons were required to conform the home to UBC standards,
(T.220:17-25).

Nevertheless, in a show of good faith, Jacksons

offered to correct any construction deficiencies associated with
the

home

at

Jacksons'

cost.

(Exs. 34, 35;).

Furthermore,

Jacksons left the door open by stating that even though they were
going forward with the Trustee's Sale, they would correct the
construction deficiencies if they could get a commitment from
Mostrongs for financing by the date of the sale. (T. 288:5-18; Ex.
34, 35; Addendums D, E; Finding No. 28, 29, R. 525, 526).
Jacksons never received

a reply

from Mostrongs

to said

offers, (T.288:5-18) nor did Mostrongs tender the property back
to Jacksons or request a rescission of the contract. (T.289:814,T.290:17-23,T.100:12-19)
B.

Mostrongs' Efforts
Reasonable.

To

Obtain

Financing

Were

Not

The trial court's findings show that 1) Zions First National
Bank was willing to loan the necessary financing after Larry
Mostrong established residency and verification of income in Utah
for two years (T.71:8-17,T.153:1-19 ); Mostrongs made no application for financing from September 1, 1987 until approximately the
time

the Note became due on September

Jacksons

offered

to

carry

financing

1, 1989
for

(T.72;7-13);

Mostrongs

for

an

additional year upon certain conditions—Mostrongs refused. (T.
286:7-17),

After all apparent impediments to financing were

removed, Mostrongs took no further steps to obtain bank or FHA
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financing in order to pay off the Note.

(The aforementioned

facts support Finding No. 13, R. 531; Finding No. 18, R. 529;
Finding No. 24, R. 528; and Findings No. 29 and 30, R. 526).
Mostrongs argue that it would have been an exercise in
futility to attempt financing before September 1, 1989, because
of

the

two-year waiting

period

required

to establish

Larry

Mostrong's residency and income verification in Utah.
The irony in Mostrongs' argument and perhaps some of the
most damaging evidence as to Mostrongs' position in this case, is
that if Larry Mostrong was required to establish a two-year
residency in Utah for verification of income, under no possible
circumstances could Mostrongs ever have qualified for financing.
The record is clear that Larry Mostrong resided in California
during much of the time the contract was in effect and that he
could not have established the required proof of residency and
income in Utah at the time the Note became due. (T.73:21-25,T.74:
1-7,T.98:16-22,T.149:13-25,T.150:1-17,T.153:2-27; Finding No. 18,
R. 529).
IX.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ANY RIGHTS
WHICH MOSTRONGS MAY HAVE HAD TO RESCISSION UNDER ANY STATED
FACTS WERE WAIVED BY THE FAILURE OF MOSTRONGS TO PROMPTLY
NOTIFY JACKSONS OF MOSTRONGS INTENTION TO RESCIND THE
CONTRACT AND BY MOSTRONGS FAILURE TO TENDER BACK THE
PROPERTY UPON MOSTRONGS LEARNING OF THE LACK OF LEGAL ACCESS
OVER THE SOUTH LANE AND UPON LEARNING OF ALLEGED
DEFICIENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE LOCATED ON THE
PROPERTY.
Utah law is well established as to the responsibilities of

the party who elects to rescind a contract.

In Parry v. Woodall,

438

Court

P. 2d

813,

(1968) the

Utah

Supreme

announced

the

responsibility of a party who elects rescission as a remedy.

In

ruling that a party had waived his right to rescission of the
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contract, the Court

stated:

"...one who claims he has

been

deceived and elects to rescind his contract by reason of fraud or
misrepresentation
promptly

and

of

the

other

unequivocally

in

contracting

party

announcing

his

must

act

intention".

(emphasis added) Id., at 815.
The Court further stated:
The law is well settled that one electing to
rescind a contract must tender back to the other
contracting party whatever property of value he has
received. Woodall elected to retain possession of the
corporate assets and to carry on the business until it
was taken over in the receivership proceedings. We are
of the opinion that Woodall waited too long, and that
he cannot now rescind the contract.
Id., at 815.
Waiver has been defined as "the voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right" and may be either express or
implied.

5 Williston

on Contracts, §

678

(3rd

Ed.

1961).

Express waiver, when supported by reliance thereon, excuses nonperformance of the waived condition. 5 Williston on Contracts, §
679 (3rd Ed. 1961); Restatement (2d) of Contract, § 84(1)(1981).
In considering waiver of a breach of a contract condition,
the Idaho Supreme Court stated in C.I.T. Corporation v. Hess, 395
P.2d 471 (1964) that:
Assuming plaintiff's breach was of a nature
sufficient to discharge defendant's obligation to
perform, it is well recognized that the obligation of
a party under a bilateral contract may be recreated by
the rendition of further performance, with knowledge of
the fact entitling him to be discharged.
Id. , at 475. (See Clover Park School District #400 v. Consolidated Dairy Products, Co., 15 Wash. App. 429, 550 P.2d 47 (1976),
where the court stated, "[w]hen a party fails to take steps to
rescind within a reasonable time and instead follows a course of
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conduct inconsistent therewith, the conclusion follows that he
has waived his right of rescission and chosen to continue the
contract". Id., at 50.
The trial court's finding that Mostrongs did not vacate the
property until on or about September 25, 1990 (date of Trustee's
Sale); and that Mostrongs did not tender the property back to
Jacksons or notify Jacksons of any intent to repudiate or rescind
the agreement, is supported by the record.(Finding No. 32,R. 525)
Furthermore, that Mostrongs waived any right they may have
had to rescission was established by their conduct, which was
inconsistent with their current claims.
The

evidence

shows

that Mostrongs

had

both

actual

and

constructive notice of the state of affairs regarding the legal
access to the property.

Even had Mostrongs testified that they

were not concerned with access to the property, which is contrary
to the evidence established at trial, Mostrongs were on constructive notice regarding the chain of title to the property and as
such were required to ascertain the record.

After learning of

the construction deficiencies noted in Joseph Stott's appraisal,
Mostrongs nevertheless continued to remain in possession of the
property, effectively ratifying the agreement. For approximately
one year prior to the Trustee's Sale, Mostrongs made outward
representations that they would accept the property under the
agreement. Jacksons initially extended the final balloon payment
under the Note for three months based on Jennifer Mostrongs
representation

that

she was

seeking

financing

(T.284:6-19) .

Mostrongs actively sought continuations of the Trustee's Sale for
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purposes of seeking an easement to the south lane (T.8518-22,
T.78:9-17) and Jacksons accommodated them.
After receiving the letter from the Millard County Commission

accepting

the

south

lane

as

a public

road,

Mostrongs

represented to the appraiser, Joseph Stott, that the easement
problem had been taken care of (T.119:17-22) and utilized said
Millard County Commission letter of acceptance, for bank financing. (T.268:12-23).

When Mostrongs were advised that financing

could not be obtained through Valley Central Bank due to an
inquiry regarding four construction deficiencies, Mostrongs took
no further action.

Even though Jacksons, in good faith, offered

to pay for such structural deficiencies on two separate occasions, Mostrongs refused to respond.

Nevertheless, Mostrongs

remained in possession of the property until the Trustee's Sale.
Mostrongs never made contact with Jacksons to inform them as to
why they suddenly ceased all efforts to obtain financing, once
all apparent impediments had been removed.
It has been established that Mostrongs never tendered the
property back to Jacksons or requested their money. (T.289:9-14)
Jennifer Mostrong herself testified that she never attempted to
rescind the contract. (T.100:6-19)
Mostrongs exhibited conduct inconsistent with rescission
demonstrating their intent to let the contract stand.

As a

result, Jacksons continuously granted Mostrongs additional time
in which to perform the terms of the contract

(approximately

thirteen months from the date the balloon payment became due).
Nevertheless, once all alleged impediments to financing had been
cured, Mostrongs elected to wait until approximately the same
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time as the Trustee's Sale to file a lawsuit, while still in
possession of the property.
When Jacksons finally did take possession of the property
several days after the Trustee's Sale, they noticed excessive
waste and damage to the property-

Jacksons thereafter spent

thousands of dollars in order to restore the property as it was
prior to the sale. (Finding No. 33, R. 525; Ex. 48).
X.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COURT COSTS ARE NOT WARRANTED IN THIS
ACTION - THE PREVAILING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO COSTS ON
APPEAL.
The District Court correctly determined that neither party

has shown a legal basis to support a claim for attorneys' fees.
In Utah, attorneys' fees are not recoverable unless provided
for by contract or by statute. Mountain States Broadcasting Co.
v. Neal, 776 P.2d 643, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Mostrongs have not established that they would be entitled
to

attorneys'

fees

under

any

of

the

theories

they

claim

(Mostrongs have failed to establish that there was fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation).

Furthermore, the Jacksons having

purchased the property at the Trustee's Sale, the provisions for
attorneys' fees in the Note and Trust Deed were extinguished.
The Court so properly concluded.
CONCLUSION
Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings to demonstrate that: "Even if viewed
in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the findings". Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989).

The findings

should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, with due regard
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given

to

the

opportunity

of

the

trial

court

to

judge

the

credibility of witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The District Court's findings and conclusions are greatly
supported by the record.
Based upon the authorities and arguments set forth herein,
Appellee respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment
entered by the District Court.
DATED this

/ £

day of October, 1992

RICHKRDXWADD INGHAM, ESQ.
WADDINGHAM & PETERSON, P.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, RICHARD WADDINGHAM, hereby certify that on the

/j?

day

of October, 1992 I served upon Plaintiffs/Appellants four (4)
true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee by
causing

the

same

to

be

mailed,

postage

following:
D. David Lambert
Linda J. Barclay
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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pre-paid,

to

the

ADDENDUM

ntc No

1 2 J Lonv,

Ocm Printing, Co

E/ ..MEST MONEY SALES AGREEMEN.
iend======^25<X)

No(0)

T

p**>y V n c t r n n g ,

ARNEST MONEY the amount of
he form of t

«» *\

July l£,V?P7

DATE
The undersigned Buyer

, ,'J

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

Personal

1^<

Oftotilo

^VJVQ,

-Jl C e n t r O ,

CA 9 ? 2 l l 3

— hereby deposits with Brokerage

T^T/P"nn^rpH

D o i l a r s ($

ch?C.k

500tOO

j

which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law

Earnest money check to be deposited Friday July 17, 1987^
Davies k Go, Realty
7U3-687S
Received by ^ / V C M A X ^ ^
kerage

Phone Number

r
)^aJJ\LL^

^~^

OFFER TO PURCHASE
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the .property situated at —JcLSt

,n the City of
County of M l l l a r i
Utah
Flowell
;ct to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utility or other easements or r»6h(s of way government patents or state deads of record approved by Buyer
cordaVce with Sect.on G Sa.d property is more particularly described as

South

One h a l f

Of

Southwest

1/U

of

Northeast

1/U

Southeast l/h of Sec. 22 ? T. 21 S.. K. S W»» S.L»M, containing 5 Acres,
HECK APPLICABLE BOXES
I UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Vacant Lot

I IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Commercial

(a) 'Included items.

D Vacant Acreage
D Residential

OOther

_

D Condo

_

D Other ftanchette

Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property

The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title C a r p e t s j d r a p e s
Fltohpn rt,ove * T?qfr1.e*rfltQr fr Wood s t o v e t
(b) Excluded items
The following items are specifically excluded from this sale
Gas J o t t l e ,T i l e p h o n e s M i c r o w a v e OVen»

Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS
3public sewer Dconnected
CXwell [^connected Dother
[^electricity
^connected
] septic tank 33 connected
G irrigation water/secondary system
Congress & egress by private easement
]other sanitary system
]public water Dconnected
]private water Dconnected
(d)

Survey

(e)

Buyer Inspection

*f of shares
Company
D T V antenna Dmaster antenna Dprewired
Dnatural gas Dconnected

D dedicated road
Dcurb and gutter
Dother rights

A certified survey Dshall be furnished at the expense of

condition, except

D paved

prior to closing

Oshall not be furnished

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical

No e x c e p t i o n s

PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING.

The total purchase price for the property is

C

JJ<ty

Dollars ($

FJV?

"faouqarvi

^5,000.00

) which shall be paid as follows

which represents the aforedesenbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed
by buyer which obligation bears jnterest at
which include

Dpnncipal,

Dinterest

% per annum with monthly payments of $

Dtaxes

Dinsurance,

Dcondo fees

Dother

„

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer which obligation bears interest at
which include

Dpnncipal.

Dinterest

Dtaxes.

% per annum with monthly payments of $
Dinsurance,

Dcondo fees

representing balance if any, including proceeds from a new

\500,00

—:
IOOO.OO

Other

j

^vn~

PrnnoqHg

r>f

n loan

tn

novernT^n"1 A.genry

hp

Dother

loan to be paid as follows

n,gHp

hy

7H nn*

lank,

(^.^tfti

OV

Other

—

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

uyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procure same and this
made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees to make application within __£
ter Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed
r does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within
jption of the Buyer or^eller upon written notice
er agrees to pay sffi
A«r««^

,00

IS

%

days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement this Agreement shall be voidable

towards Buyer s total financing and closing costs including but not limited to loan discount points

EARNESi MONEY SALES AGREL.rfENT
Legend

Yes (X)

No (0)

This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
•

• (Sections?)

A-^JNCLUDED I T E M S . . Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: plumbing
itihg/ajr-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains 8nd draperies
i rods/window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage dot
iner end transmitter(s), fencing, trees and shrubs.
B.~ INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not b,
ison of iany representation madeito Buyer by Seller or the listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income
refrom or'as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires
/ additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property whicr
s not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, hens or other encumbrance*
any nature shall be brought current on or before closing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems electrical system, and appliance,
all be sound or tn satisfactory working condition at closing
0 . - CONDITION OF WELL. SeUer warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Sellers' knowledge provided an adequate supply i
iter and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order anc
*ller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing
eller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require tM
jnsent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in ti•ent of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after notice of
onwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice
) Seller or Seller s agent In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions
>r said "Due on Sale ' clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void
G TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, Buyc<
hall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary title report on the subject property
luyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept, Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seliu^
»r Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure tlu
lefect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the opt«v»
)f the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form A U 7
policy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other ths.
hose provided for in said standard form. *and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreeme.
shall thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge
If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) day
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES
after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a copy of all ex.stmg leases (and any amendments thereto) affectu
the property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject to sue
leases. If objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void
J. .CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes m any existing leases shall be made, n
new leases entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent oMhe Buyer

„HO CpNVjEYANCE OF Tl"
Seller represents lluit Seller D holds title to the pr
ty in fee simple D is purchasing the properly undi
s act Transfer of Seller's ownersi
interest shall be made as sm iorth m Suction S SoUur agrees to furnish good and marketable \\\\o to \h
*/j$c"t to encumbrances and exceptions noted heroin, evidenced by O a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price D an abstrac
ctught current, with an attorney s opinion (See Section H)
4<< INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing
uyer;'shall,Jake title subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R s) Buyer Q has D has not reviewed any condoifnium^QC^R s prior to signing this Agreement.
Title shall vest in Buyer as follows

$11 VESTING'OF JITLE.

6/SSP.El-lER WARRANTIES

LarrV

K

Bs^Jolnt t e n a n t s

L«

MostrODC)

and

Jpnifpr

ft.

Mnctrnnn

In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following ifems are also warranted

xceDttdfts~tb7the above and Section C shall be limited to the following

L

/ . ^ P E U I A L c O N S i u t K A i i U N S ANU UUNTINGENCIES.

i satisfiedVnor to closing

SPIIPTR

This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which mus

t n pay c l o s i n g c o s t 3 f

points and a p p r a i s a l feeg»

1
a t a rea
8
CLOSING OF SALE
This Agreement shall be closed on or before
15 Ajjnttqt
^
sonable location to be designated b
»ller, subject to Section Q Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow "Closing* umce all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance

th this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be made as of u date of possession Q date of closing Q other _ _ _ _ _

9

PQSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on .

__

. unless extended by written agreement of parties

.10, ,GENERAL PROVISIONS
Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into thisjreement by reference
j
' 1 1 . " AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND T I M E LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. ^ Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller
all have until.
(XM/PM) i l l l l y
ERNEST MONEY to the Buyer

?fl

, 19

gnature of Buyer

ff*7

. to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the
Dat

Signature of Buyer

7-Af$f

1ECKONE ^
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above
REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

.'(Seller's Initials)

COUNTER OFFER Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, anc
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer s acceptance Buyer shall have until
specified below

ite 7-/^-^7
l
™ .. ^ , W ? (A^PM?

^/r

(AM/PM)

, 19

to accept the term

S)

.</£(•
no
Signat ure of S e l W

/

/

Sj(jnature of/Seller

'

fECKONE
Buyer accepts the counter offer
Buyer accepts with modifications on attached addendum
ite
. (AM-PM)
COMMISSION

The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to

:ommis>iQn 0 f

Fjy/g

Signature of Buyer

Signature of Buyer

DflVJ F f i

(%5% )

& CD*

, (Brokerage

R p f l l t,\/

as considerat/on k/r the efforts in procujjog a buyer

Date

^ Signature of Seller

7//

Dat

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefor
completed)
A D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures
3NATUREOF SELLER

v

7

/j

(I

_

SIGj^TURE o £ f c i # E R

Date

R n i norcn -> ii / rancoH y final rnrwj nf thp (nrpnmnn Anrppmpnt hpnnnn all sianatures to be mailed on .

?~*r-&

/

Date
Date

., 19

by

K
AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS
If Buyer or Seller is a corporat.on. partnership trust estate or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on .
ihalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller
' ^ C O M P L E T E AGREEMENT - NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the part.es and supersedes a*
mcels any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no verbal agreements which mod>
affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto shall incorporate all the provisions of th >
jreement not expressly modified or excluded therein
N.~DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidate J
images or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of an
press condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money depos \(
lall be returned to Buyer. Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shas
ly all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursuing ar r
medy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnes
oney deposit is requ.red to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Selk
ithonze the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amour t
deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting
irty shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney s fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
0.

ABROGATION.

Execution of a final real estate contract, if any, shall abrogate this Agreement

P. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the proper,
tween the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, 8nd the cost to repair such damage shall exceed
i percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may. at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or
place damaged property prior to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price
id Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreeu '
Q
T I M E IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport
ikes, fire, flood, extreme weather governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller then the closing date shai.
extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter
ne is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date "Closing shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signe^
d delivered by all parties to the transaction
R
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half (112) of the escrow closing fee unless otherwise required by the lending institution Cost*
providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance if acceptaole to the Buyef
its, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserve>
all be assigned to Buyer at closing
S
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty de«d free of defects other th<*r
ose excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract Seller may transfer by either (a) special
irranty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the
id existing real estate contract therein
T

AGENCY DISCLOSURE

U

BROKERAGE

V

DAYS

Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller

For purposes of this Agreement

any references to the term "Brokerage

For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term

AGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM.

days

shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office

shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE C O M M I S S I O N

Form No 1402(1/70)
ALTA Owner s Policy
FormB — 1970
(Amended 10-17-70)
(Standard Coverage)

s
\
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^

OWNER'S
POLICY

c

COPY
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
ISSUED THROUGH THE OFFICE OF

<^S

OF SOUTHERN UTAH

180 SOUTH MAIN

•

P.O. BOX 658 •
(801) 743-6213

FILLMORE, UTAH 84631

SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY a California corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A,
against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees
and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the insured
by reason of
1 title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein,
2 any defect in or hen or encumbrance on such title,
3 lack of a right of access to and from the land, or
4 unmarketability of such title

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, First American Title Insurance Company has caused this policy to be signed and sealed by
its duly authorized officers as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A

First American Title Insurance Company

/

<;\u[..:*^\
BY

\ -

\

ATTEST
^ v

COUNTERSIGNED
PRESIDENT

SE°TEMBER 24 • * /
1968
' <r i

c ^c^ r ^.
SECRETARY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

scutum L o: EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
THE FOLLOWING MATTERS ARE EXPRESSLY E X C L U D E D F-ROM THE COVERAGE OF THIS POLICY
1. A N Y LAW, O R D I N A N C E OR G O V E R N M E N T A L R E G U L A T I O N ( I N C L U D I N G BUT NOT L I M I T E D TO BUILDJNC? A N D ZONING ORDINA
R E S T R I C T I N G OR R E G U L A T I N G OR PROHIBITING THE OCCUPANCY, USE OR ENJOYMENT OF THE L A N D , OR REGULATING THE ,
A C T E R , DIMENSIONS OR LOCATION OF A N Y I M P R O V E M E N T NOW OR HEREAFTER ERECTED ON THE L A N D , OR PROHIBIT'
S E P A R A T I O N IN OWNERSHIP OR A R E D U C T I O N IN THE DIMENSIONS OR AREA OF THE L A N D , OR THE EFFECT OF A N Y V I O L /
OF A N Y SUCH LAW, O R D I N A N C E OR G O V E R N M E N T A L R E G U L A T I O N .
2

RIGHTS OF E M I N E N T D O M A I N OR G O V E R N M E N T A L RIGHTS OF POLICE POWER UNLESS NOTICE OF THE EXERCISE OF SUCH R K
A P P I A R S IN THE PUBLIC RECORDS AT DATE OF POLICY.

3

DEFTCTS, LIENS, ENCUMBRANCES, ADVERSE CLAIMS, OR OTHER MATTERS (a) C R E A T E D , S U F F E R E D , ASSUMED OR AGREED U
THE INSURED C L A I M A N T , (b) NOT KNOWN TO THE COMPANY A N D NOT SHOWN BY THE PUBLIC RECORDS BUT KNOWN TC
INSURED C L A I M A N T EITHER AT DATE OF POLICY OR AT THE DATE SUCH C L A I M A N T A C Q U I R E D AN ESTATE OR INTL
I N S U R E D BY THIS POLICY A N D NOT DISCLOSED IN W R I T I N G BY THE INSURED C L A I M A N T TO THE COMPANY PRIOR TO THE
SUCH INSURED C L A I M A N T BECAME AN INSURED H E R E U N D E R ; (c) RESULTING IN NO LOSS OR DAMAGE TO THE INSURED CLAIi\
(d) A T T A C H I N G OR CREATED SUBSEQUENT TO DATE OF POLICY; OR (e) RESULTING IN LOSS OR DAMAGE WHICH WOULD NOT r
BEEN SUSTAINED IF THE INSURED C L A I M A N T H A D PAID V A L U E FOR THE ESTATE OR INTEREST INSURED BY THIS PC

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
1.

D E F I N I T I O N OF TERMS

The following
policy mucin

terms v^hen used

in this

(a)
insured'
the insured named in
Schedule A, and subject to * n / rights or defenses
the Company may have had against the named in
sured, those who succeed to the interest of such
insured by operation of law as distinguished from
purchase including, but not limited to, heirs,
distnbutees, devisees, survivors personal representa
tives, next of kin, or corporate or fiduciary
successors
claiming

(b)
"insured claimant"
an insured
'oss or damage hereunder

(c)
"knowledge ' actual knowledge,
not constructive knowledge or notice which may be
imputed to an insured by reason of any public
records
(d)
land
the lund described, speci
ficaliy or by reference in Schedule C, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real
property, provided, however, the term "land" does
not include any property beyond the lines of the
area specifically described or referred to m Schedule
C, nor any right, title, interest estate or easement
in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes,
ways or waterways but nothing herein shall modi
fy or limit the extent to which a right of access to
and from the land is insured by this policy
(e)
"mortgage ' mortgage, deed of
trust, trust deed, or other security instrument
(f)
"public records ' those records
which by Uw impart constructive notice of matters
relating to said land
2.

C O N T I N U A T I O N OF INSURANCE A F T E R
C O N V E Y A N C E OF T I ^ L E

The coverage of this policy shall continue in
force as of Date of Policy m favor of an insured so
long as such insured retains an estate or interest in
the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase monev mortgage given by a purchaser from
such insured, or so long as such insured shall have
liability by reason of covenants of warranty made
by such insured in any transfer or conveyance of
such estate or interest, provided, however, this
policy shall not continue in force in favor of any
purchaser from such insured of either said estate or
interest or the indebtedness secured by a purchase
money mortgage given to such insured

3.

DEFENSE A N D PROSECUTION OF AC
T I O \ , - NOTICE O r C L A I M TO BE
GIVn
BY AN INSURED C L A I M A N T

(a) The Company at its own cost and with
out undue o lay shah piovide for the defense of an

insured in all litigation consisting of actions or
proceedings commenced against such insured, or a
defense interposed against an insured in an action
to enforce a contract for a sale of the estate or
interest in said land, to the extent that such liti
gation is founded upon an alleged defect, lien,
pneumbrance, or other matter insured against
by this policy
(b)The insured shall notify the Company
promptly in writing (i) in case any action or proceeding is begun or defense is interposed as set
forth in la) above, (n) in case knowledge shall
come to an insured hereunder of any claim of title
or interest which is adverse to the title to the
estate or interest, as insured, and which might
cause loss or damage for which the Company may
be liable by virtue of this policy, or (m) if title to
the estate or interest, as insured, is rejected as un
marketable If such prompt notice shall not be
given to the Company, then as to such insured all
liability of the Company shall cease and terminate
in regard to the matter or matters for which such
prompt notice is required, provided, however, that
failure to notify shall in no case prejudice the
rights of any such insured under this policy unless
the Company shall be prejudiced by such failure
and then only to the extent of such prejudice
(c) The Company shall have the right at its
own cost to institute and without undue delay
prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or
desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest as insured, and the Company may take any
appropriate action under the terms of this policy,
whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and
shall not thereby concede liability or waive any
provision of this policy
(d) Whenever
the Company
shall have
brought any action or interposed a defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy,
the Company may pursue any such litigation to
final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in its sole
discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or
order
(e) In all cases where this policy permits
or requires the Company to prosecute or provide
for the defense of any action or proceeding, the insured hereunder shall secure to the Company the
right to so prosecute or provide defense in such action or proceeding, and all appeals therein, and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of
such insured for such purpose Whenever requested
by the Company, such insured shall give the
Company all reasonable aid in any such action or
proceeding in effecting settlement, securing evi
dence obtaining witnesses, or prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding, and the Company
shall reimburse such insured for any e<pense so
incurred

4.

NOTICE
ACTION

OF

LOSS -

LIMITATION

In addition to the notices required
paragraph 3(b) of these Conditions and StipuU
a statement in writing of any loss or d a n \
which it is claimed the Company is liabk
this policy shall be furnished to the Coi r
within 90 days after such loss or damage shai
been determined and no right of action shall oJ
to an insured claimant until 30 days afte
statement shall have been furnished Faik r
furnish such statement of loss or damage
terminate any liability of the Company und<policy as to such loss or damage

5

OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE
TLE CLAIMS

The Company shall have the option to s
otherwise settle for or in the name of an ir
claimant any claim insured against or to ten
all liability and obligations of the Company
under by paying or tendering payment c f
amount of insurance under this policy tog
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expense
curred up to the time of such payment or ten
payment, by the insured claimant and authc
by the Company

6.

DETERMINATION
LOSS

AND

PAYMEN i

(a) The liability of the Company uno*
policy shall in no case exceed the least of
claimant,

(i)
or

the

actual

loss of

the in

(it)

the amount of insurance stu

Schedule A
(b) The Company will pay, in additiu
any loss insured against by this policy, all co,
posed upon an insured in litigation carried r
the Company for such insured, and all <
attorneys' fees and expenses in litigation c<
on by such insured with the written authonz
of the Company
(c) When liability has been definitely
in accordance with the conditions of this p
the loss or damage shall be payable within 3C
thereafter

{Continued on inside back cover)
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i'onn No, 1.402 - A
ALIA OwueT' > P o l i c y
Form £ - 1970

r No, 264J3-M

COPY

SCHEDULE A

Total Foe for T i t l e S e a r c h , Fxarciration
And T i t l * InHutfmco $347.50

Auount o£ I n s u r a n c e :

September

Oate oi Polic^

]*

$65,000.00

P o l i c y No. 5198-12M

1, 1987 wt 11:04 A.ll,

I^a,nr. ot Irjbur^d:

1.AFRY 3-. MOSTt'ONG ind JENNIFER G, MOSTi^NG

1',

Thu <?-i4it*s or iur<*ri»Kt rel*»rrH to horsi'i 1 •> at f< ^

LARRY U

3*

of Policy vented in:

M0STR0HG and JENRIFKR C. MOSTRONG,
his wife as joint tensors

The. «btate or Interest in the land described
cov*>r'c* bv this policy la:

FF.E SIMPi.F

in Schedule C and which is

.'. j rn No. i4 ' - 0
ALTA S t a n d a r d P o l i c y
Ui.stern
Re^ Ion

'j\y?>-i£A

SCHEDULE B

QPY

This policy does not injure against loss or damage by reason oi the matter**
ihown in piiits ow and two following:
PART ONE;
U

T&xt\s «r assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records
of duy taxing authority that levies tax*s or assesbiu^nts oa real property
or bv th*> public records,

2.

Aay facts, rights, Interests, or claims which art- not ^hown by rh* public
records but which could be ascertained bv an inspection of said land or
by uokinq inquiry of persons in possession thereof.

3»

Enuemo\itsf
claims of easement or encumbrance which are not shown by the
public records.

4,

Discrepancies*
conflicts
in
boundary
Jinas,
shortage
In
area,
encroachments, or any other f.ictb which n correct survey would disclose,
and which are not shown by public records.

5,

Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in
Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water rights, claims or title to
water*

C

kiy I U P M or right to « 11 *n, for eervk-fts, labor or uaterinl theretofore
or h<Meeftsr furnished, imposed by law and not shown by the public
records*

PART TWO:
!•

Taxes tor the year 1987 now a li«n, not yet due.

2.

Faeemr-it tor Road and Utility purposes over the East
property as recited in cunsne lustruio^nts of record*

3,

A D*cd o£ Trust dite.d September 1, 1987• executed by LARKY U MOSTRONG
and JENNIFER C* KOSTRONG, his wife, ns Trustor, to secure payment of a
note bearing even date thereof in the suia of $45,000*00 with Interest
thereon, payable as therein provided, to SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OB'
SOUTHERN UTAii as Trustee, in favor of T,FE ROY JACKSON and MARGARET R.
JACKSON, his wife as joint tenants, as Beneficiary* recorded September 1,
1967 a. Entry No, 65995 in Book 211 at Page 670 of Official Records.

4*

Oil and G*a Lease dated November 15, 1977 trom RESORT PROPERTIES, INC., a
ttevada corporation, as Lessor, to PLACID OIL COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation, as Lessee for a term of 10 year* from November 15, 1977, and
so long thereafter as oil unci gas, or either of them, is produced from
the 1-ind, upon the terras, conditions and covenants therein provided;
recorded December 20, 1977 as Entry No, 23299 in Book 125 at Page 174 of
Offiei il Records*

33 feet of said

1 fKJ •
An undivided interest of PLACID OIL COMPANY in anid""l)tl and Gas leus* was
assip.n'»d to 10131 ST ANA-HUNT PLTROLEUM CORPORATION *,n undivided 16,80672%
and to F.0SEW00D RESOURCFS Ji'JC. an undivided 18.90756% by Assignment,
Conveyance and Hill of Sa]g dated Jure 13, 1983^ recorded February 6,
1984 (JK Entry No. 51269 in Book 179 <\X Vn%* 271 of Official. Records.
Th« Interest of PLACID OLL COMPANY, LOU F SI ANA-HUNT PETROLEUM CORPORATION
and ROSEWOOD RESOURCES (FOC) , LXC< in said lease was assigned to SOH10
PETROLEUM COMPANY by Assignment of Lc>anc>s dated April 2, 1984 and
recorded November 23, 1984 as Entry No. 54306 in Look 1&6 at Page 237 of
Official Records.

SCHEDULE C
The land referred to ia this policy is situated io the St.atp of Utah, Couocy
ot MiJlard and is described ah follows:
The South LalE ot the Southwest quarter of th'-i Northeast quarter of the
Southeast quarter of Section 22, Township 21 South. Range 5 U&st, Sale Lake
Base **nd Meridian.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM 1/4 of all o1l $ gas and other minor/Us in, on or uader
said land, together with the right of ingress And egress for the purpose of
exploring uiui/or
removing the same.
:<

it

rt

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
(Continued from inside front cover)

7.

L I M I T A T I O N OF

LIABILITY

No claim shall arise or be maintainable under
this policy (a) if the Company, after having received
notice of an alleged defect, lien or encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise,
removes such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title, as insured, w i t h i n a reasonable
time after receipt of such notice; (b) in the event
of litigation until there has been a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all appeals therefrom, adverse to the
title, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof;
or (c) for liability voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit w i t h o u t prior
written consent of the Company.
8.

R E D U C T I O N OF

LIABILITY

All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs, attorneys' fees and expenses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance
pro tanto. No payment shall be made w i t h o u t
producing this policy for endorsement of such
payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in
which case proof of such loss or destruction shall
be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company.
9.

LIABILITY

NONCUMULATIVE

It is expressly understood that the amount of
insurance under this policy shall be reduced by any
amount the Company may pay under any policy
insuring either (a) a mortgage shown or referred to
in Schedule B hereof which is a lien on the estate
or interest covered by this policy, or (b) a mortgage
hereafter executed by an insured which is a charge
or lien on the estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A , and the amount so paid
shall be deemed a payment under this policy. The
Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such mortgages any amount that
otherwise w o u l d be payable hereunder to the insured owner of the estate or interest covered by
this poiicy and the amount so paid shall be deemed
a payment under this policy to said insured owner.

10.

APPORTIONMENT

12.

If the land described in Schedule C consists of two or more parcels which are not used as
a single site, and a loss is established affecting one
or more of said parcels but not all, the loss shall
be computed and settled on a pro rata basis as if
the amount of insurance under this policy was divided pro rata as to the value on Date of Policy of
each separate parcel to the whole, exclusive of any
improvements made subsequent to Date of Policy,
unless a liability or value has otherwise been agreed
upon as to each such parcel by the Company and
the insured at the time of the issuance of this
policy and shown by an express statement herein
or by an endorsement attached hereto.
11.

SUBROGATION
SETTLEMENT

UPON

PAYMENT

OR

Whenever the Company shall have settled a
claim under this policy, all right of subrogation
shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of
the insured claimant. The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies
which such insured claimant would have had against
any person or property in respect to such claim
had this policy not been issued, and if requested by
the Company, such insured claimant shall transfer
to the Company all rights and remedies against any
person or property necessary in order to perfect
such right of subrogation and shall permit the
Company to use the name of such insured cloimant
in any transaction or litigation involving such rights
or remedies. If the payment does not cover the
loss of such insured claimant, the Company shall be
subrogated to such rights and remedies in the proportion which said payment bears to the amount of
said loss. If loss should result f r o m any act of such
insured claimant, such act shall not void this policy,
but the Company, in that event, shall be required
to pay only that part of any losses insured against
hereunder which shall exceed the amount, if any,
lost to the Company by reason of the impairment
of the right of subrogation.

LIABILITY

L I M I T E D TO T H I S POLK

This instrument together w i t h all en ,J
ments and other instruments, if any, a n .
hereto by the Company is the entire polic,
contract between the insured and the Com,
A n y claim of loss or damage, whether o«
based on negligence, and which arises out u f
status of the title to the estate or interest covt
hereby or any action asserting such claim, shji
restricted to the provisions and conditions
stipulations of this policy.
No amendment of or endorsement to
poiicy can be made except by writing endcr
hereon or attached hereto signed by either the Pr
dent, a Vice President, the Secretary, an Ass.*J
Secretary, or validating officer or authorized M.
tory of the Company.
13.

NOTICES, WHERE SENT

A l l notices required to be given the Con
and any statement in writing required to b
nished the Company shall be addressed to it main office at 421 North Main Street, Santu
California, or to the office which issued this pc

/ /'

870
Record (1 tt Requejt of_
at

M Fee Paid %^

by

. Dep. Book,

Mail t a \ notice to_

Kcf.

P.ise-

_Addit u_
^TC

A7.1°>^'h\

WARRANTY DEED
GLLALDINL KESLLIU, a wcnan
of
C a s t l e Dale
CONVEY
and WARUAN T to

, Count} of

grantor
, St ite of Utah, hereby

I-UL/

WILLIAM R. JAO SON an \ I o ROY JACKSON

of

t i l l m o r e , County of M i l l a r d , S t a t e of Ut ih
TEN and n o / 1 0 0 D o l l a r s and o t h e r yood -\nl v i l u a b l o c o n s i d e r a t i o n

tlie following described ti-ut
State of Ut.ih.

of land in

for the sum of
}J)QkbAcV,3,
County,

I illiid

The S o u t h w e s t q u i r t o r of t h e Northc isL q u a r t e r of t h e S o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r of
S e c t i o n 2 2 , Townohip 21 S o u t h , Rancje 5 West, s a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n ,
( c o n t a i n i n g 10 a c r e s more o r l e s s )
TOGETHER WITH and SUBJECT TO a 33 f o o t Lasement o v e r and across, t h e E a s t
33 f e e t of s a i d p r o p e r t y f o r r o a d and u t i l i t y p u r p o s e s .

^•/Li74MoiT^.J:>

>W££>>

WITNESS, the hand
September

of said giantor

day of

, this
2Jth
, A. D. 19 /0

Signed in the Presence of

Geialdme

Kessler

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

Emery

£V&/?<~

On the
«** £>
day of
personally appeared before me
Geraldme Kessler,

, A D 1970

i woman

the^signer /* -'of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me Uiat
snme. , ,
</'

/Jurr>

x

(J

s

WAX/

>he

executed the

^Gvsj
NoRry Public

A, AC*. D„&. ubLl

My copimission
CLANK « l O l

f

-y D*iO

rTG CO - 3 3 5

A EX-OStlCM CLtKK of TH

DISTRICT COURf

C?>"J

H JAN 2^ 1992 |j
RICHARD WADDINGHAM #4766
WADDINGHAM & PETERSON
Attorneys for Defendants
36 2 West Main
Delta, UT 84624
(801) 864-2748

MILLARD COUNTY
v»V^

ClerJ
— — Deput;

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LARRY L. MOSTRONG and JENNIFER
G. MOSTRONG,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vs«
LEEROY JACKSON and MARGARET R.
JACKSON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 8616
: Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen

ooOoo
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial before
the Court, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen presiding.

The

plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel D. David Lambert,
Esq. The defendant appeared and was represented by counsel Richard
Waddingham, Esq. The Court thereupon heard the evidence adduced by
the parties in support of their respective positions, reviewed the
memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, considered
the pleadings and exhibits in this matter and the Court having
entered its Memorandum Decision dated January 2, 1992, the Court
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs and defendants were residents of Millard

County, State of Utah, at the time this controversy arose.
2.
Jackson

and

On or about October 26, 1978, defendant Lee Roy
his

brother, William

Jackson, purchased

certain

property located at approximately 400 South 2588 West, Fillmore,
Utah (hereinafter referred to as "property") from a Mrs. Geraldine
Kessler. At the time of said purchase, defendant Lee Roy Jackson
obtained a policy of title insurance on said property from Security
Title Company of Fillmore, Utah.
3.

On or about November 4, 1979, a warranty deed was

recorded in the Millard County Recorder's office whereby William
Jackson and Lee Roy Jackson conveyed said property to Lee Roy
Jackson and Margaret Jackson (hereinafter referred to jointly as
"defendants"); that at said time, the only access to said property
from a public road was to the north over a private lane approximately three-fourths of a mile in length; that said lane was
unimproved and during inclement weather said lane was difficult to
travel; that no one ever contested the right of defendants or
plaintiffs to use said lane for access
4.

to the property.

In approximately July, 1979, defendants constructed

a home on said property.
5.

At the time defendants constructed the home on said

property, there was no building code in effect in Millard County.
The Uniform Building Code was not adopted by Millard County until
2

March, 1981; however, the building permit issued by Millard County
to the defendants on July 18, 1979 provided that the construction
must conform "to all ordinances of Millard County, laws per State
of Utah, the Uniform Building Code, and all rules and decisions of
the Building Inspector-"; that no final occupancy permit was sought
by the defendants upon completion of the home; that at the time
there was no building inspector employed by Millard County,
6.

That in 1979 defendants obtained oral permission

from a Mr. Burdock, the owner of the land to the south of the
subject property, to construct a lane south from the subject
property across the Burdock land to a public road, a distance of
approximately one-fourth of a mile; that defendant graded this lane
and applied a cinder base thereto; that Burdock subsequently sold
his land to Ralph G. Tuckfield; that defendants never discussed
this lane with Tuckfield and continued to use the same without
objection; that defendants used this south lane as a primary access
to the subject property, but they also used the north lane for
egress and ingress to the subject property from time to time,
7.

In July, 1987, Mostrongs (hereinafter referred to as

"plaintiffs") entered into negotiations with defendants for the
purchase of defendants' property.
8.

During the initial discussion between plaintiff

Larry Mostrong and defendant Lee Roy Jackson, plaintiff offered
defendant $55,000,00 for the property. However, defendant specifically informed plaintiff that he would not sell the property for
3

less

than

$65,000,00.

Plaintiffs

thereafter

agreed

to

pay

defendant $65,000,00 for said property.
9.
for

the

Prior to entering into an Earnest Money Agreement

purchase

of

said

property,

defendant

Larry

Mostrong

inspected the subject property on at least three occasions; the
parties are in agreement that the north lane and the south lane
were discussed on these occasions.

However, plaintiffs testified

that it was represented by defendants that while the north lane was
available, the south lane was the primary access, that such lane
would be there "always" and that the south lane was a private road
which plaintiffs would have to maintain.

On the other hand, the

defendants testified that plaintiffs were informed that the north
lane was the legal access to the subject property and that the
south lane was for convenience only and was only a permissive use.
The Court finds that the evidence does not preponderate in support
of the plaintiffs' position with respect to such south lane.
10.

Plaintiffs and defendants entered into an integrated

Earnest Money Agreement on or about July 15, 1987 for a total
purchase price of $65,000.00. (Ex. 1.)
11.

Two

appraisals

were

performed

on

the

subject

property after the Earnest Money Agreement was .signed but before
the September 1, 1987 closing.

Neither appraisal identified any

problems concerning access to the subject property or the condition
of the property. (Exhibits 2A and 2B)
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12.

At approximately the same time that the parties

executed said Earnest Money Agreement, plaintiffs applied for a
conventional loan through Zions First National Bank.

Plaintiffs

were unable to produce the required down payment for a conventional
loan through Zions First National Bank and, therefore, on or about
August 4, 1987 made application through Zions First National Bank
for FHA financing.
13.

On August 28, 1987, Zions First National Bank, the

parent company of Zions Mortgage Company, notified plaintiffs that
it had turned down their application for credit on the basis of
insufficient verification of income because Mr. Mostrong was selfemployed and had not resided in Utah for a sufficient time to
establish his income. (Exhibit 2)

However, Zions First National

Bank specifically informed the plaintiffs that the bank would be
willing to loan plaintiffs the necessary financing for the property
after plaintiffs established stability of income over a two-year
period.
14.

Both parties were still interested in completing the

sale and the defendants stated that they would carry the financing
on the house for two years to allow the plaintiffs to establish a
sufficient income history and residency in Utah so as to satisfy
such bank lending requirements for financing.

Thereafter the

parties held a closing for the sale of the property memorialized by
a Warranty Deed, a Trust Deed Note and a Deed of Trust on September
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1, 1981,

(Exhibit 4), and plaintiffs took possession of the subject

property.
15.

At the time of said closing, defendants conveyed by

Warranty Deed and plaintiffs accepted only that property described
as follows:
The South half of the Southwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 22, Township 21 South, Range 5 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Excepting therefrom h of all oil, gas and
other minerals in on or under said land,
together with the right of ingress and egress
for the purpose of exploring and/or removing
the same.
Together with that certain underground water
well identified as: Water User's Claim No.
67-885, Application No. 53542, Certificate No.
12844.
Together with all improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging.
Subject to covenants, conditions, restrictions, reservations, rights of way and easements in existence and/or of record.
Said conveyance did not specifically include any easement for
access from the north or the south.
16.

(Exhibit 4)

Upon purchasing said property, plaintiffs obtained

a policy of title insurance on said property from Security Title
Company of Millard County, which policy insured against lack of a
right of access to the property.
17.

All parties reasonably believed at the time of

closing that the only apparent obstacle to bank financing was the.
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two-year residency for verification of plaintiffs' income.

The

parties therefore agreed in order to give plaintiffs time to
accomplish the intended FHA or other acceptable financing to enter
into said Note and Trust Deed as an interim measure.
18.

From the date plaintiffs signed said Trust Deed Note

on September 1, 1987, until shortly before such Note became due in
full on September 1, 1989, plaintiffs never made further application for financing. At various times during this two-year period,
plaintiff Larry Mostrong worked and lived in California.
19.

On or about September 1, 1989 plaintiff Jennifer

Mostrong informed defendants that she had made application for an
FHA loan through First Security Bank, which loan was expected to be
finalized within four (4) to six (6) weeks.

As a result, defen-

dants granted plaintiffs an additional three (3) months in which to
get the FHA financing.
20.

Plaintiffs thereafter informed defendants that FHA

had denied their loan request because of a question regarding an
easement to the property.

Plaintiffs further stated that they

needed a "recorded easement" to the property.
21.
a

"recorded

When plaintiffs made inquiry to defendants regarding
easement"

to

the property, defendants

contacted

Security Title Company to ascertain the status of an easement to
the property. Security Title thereupon secured a Warranty Deed for
the said north lane from Geraldine Kessler (prior owner of the
servient property) to defendants and defendants conveyed said Deed
7

for Easement to the plaintiffs, which deeds were recorded on
January 4, 1990 in the Millard County Recorder's Office.

(Plain-

tiffs' Exhibit No. 37 and Defendants' Exhibit No. 41)
22.

On December 1, 1989 the defendants recorded a Notice

of Default with respect to said Trust Deed because plaintiffs had
failed to make the balloon payment due on September 1, 1989.
23.

Plaintiffs continued their efforts to obtain bank

financing and on or about February 12, 1990 defendants offered to
carry the financing until March 1, 1991 upon certain conditions
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 36). Plaintiffs declined to accept such
conditions.
24.

A Trustee's Sale under said Trust Deed was thereupon

scheduled April 4, 1990.

On or about March 28, 1990, plaintiffs

obtained a temporary restraining order against said sale.

On or

about April 4, 1990 the parties, through their respective counsel,
negotiated an extension of said Trustee's Sale to May 18, 1990. On
or about May 17, 1990 the plaintiffs paid to defendants the sum of
$5,257.37 for back monthly payments agreed upon for plaintiffs'
continued possession of the property and for attorney fees, costs
and trustee

fees, and defendants

extended

the time for the

Trustee's Sale for an additional 60 days. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No.
27; Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 28)
25.

During the interim the plaintiffs had been negotiat-

ing with Valley Central Bank to secure a loan with which to pay off
defendants' Trust Deed.

Such a loan was conditioned upon the
8

dedication of the said Tuckfield lane as a Millard County road and
upon correction of certain perceived deficiencies in the construction of the house on the subject property.
26.

On or about May 3, 1990 plaintiffs obtained a deed

from Tuckfield for the south access to the subject property,
delivery of which was conditioned upon acceptance of said lane as
a county road.
27.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 22)
On or about May 15, 1990, the plaintiffs received a

commitment from the Millard County Commission to the effect that
the County would accept said road as a county road and would agree
to maintain "this new and improved county road."

(Exhibits Nos. 32

and 33). The Millard County Attorney took a position that such
acceptance was conditioned upon the lane being brought to county
standards (Exhibits 20 and 21) but the said County Commission
resolution did not so specifically state.

The only bid for

improving said lane was made by Reed Penny who estimated the cost
to be from $2,200 to $2,500.

Millard County Superintendent of

Roads, Lee Roper, testified that he was not contacted by plaintiffs
to ascertain what, if any, improvements were necessary to bring the
lane to County standards. The defendants refused to contribute in
any amount toward such costs.

Said improvements were never made.

Nevertheless, plaintiffs submitted the Millard County commitment to
Valley Central Bank in support of their loan application.
28.

At the request of defendants, the Millard County

Building official, Jerry Reagan, on or about June 27, 1990, made an
9

inspection of the house on the subject property and noted several
deficiencies, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 19; Carl
Faulkner, a licensed contractor, called by plaintiffs testified
that it would cost $6,085 to correct such deficiencies and that the
same could be done within a couple of days; Butch Jensen, a
licensed contractor, called by defendants, testified that it would
cost $3,212 to make such repairs (Defendants' Exhibit No, 47) and
that the same could be done in less than a week; defendants twice
offered to pay for the cost of such repairs (Defendants' Exhibit
Nos. 34 and 35), but no affirmative response was received from the
plaintiffs with respect thereto.
29.

After the Deed for Easement over the Tuckfield

property to the south was obtained, the commitment from Millard
County to accept the same as a county road and maintain the same
was received, and after defendants' offer to plaintiffs on two
separate occasions

to pay for the noted deficiencies

in the

construction of the house on the premises, the plaintiffs took no
further steps to secure bank or FHA financing in order to pay off
the said promissory note to defendants.
30.

After the said initial application for financing to

Zions First National Bank on August 4, 1987, the plaintiffs made no
further efforts to secure financing from that institution.
31.

Plaintiffs made no further payments on the said

Trust Deed Note after May 17, 1990; that the substituted Trustee
under said Deed of Trust did notice a Trustee's Sale of said
10

property for September 25, 1990 at which sale the defendants
entered a bid of $42,000, which bid was accepted and a Trustee's
Deed was issued to defendants for the subject property dated
September 27, 1990.
32.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No- 10D)

Plaintiffs did not vacate the property until on or

about September 25, 1990; that plaintiffs did not prior to said
date tender the subject property back to the defendants nor did
plaintiffs notify the defendants of any intent to repudiate or
rescind the purchase of said property.
33.

That upon retaking possession of said property on or

about October 4, 1990, the defendants noted various items of damage
to

the

subject

property

which

defendants

attributed

to the

plaintiffs (Defendants' Exhibit No. 48) The plaintiffs testified
that they left the said property in as good or better condition
than when plaintiffs took possession in 1987.
34.

Plaintiffs claim attorney fees in the sum of $13,736

based upon 205.9 hours at rates varying from $75-$100 per hour.
Counsel for plaintiff testified without contradiction that such
rates were reasonable and consistent with charges made in this area
for like services and that the services performed were reasonably
necessary in the presentation of plaintiffs' case.
Testimony was also proffered that a prior counsel for
plaintiffs had charged plaintiffs $2,987.44 for legal services
performed in connection with this case. No testimony was proffered
as to the rate at which prior counsel charged for his services, nor
11

was testimony proffered as to the reasonableness of such fee or the
necessity therefor.
35.

Defendants

claim attorney

fees

in the

sum of

$8,391.00, as shown by affidavit submitted by counsel for defendants without objection.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes as follows:
1.

Title to the property conveyed by defendants by

Warranty Deed to plaintiffs on or about September 1, 1987 was
marketable. However, no easement for access was mentioned therein.
2.

Legal access from the subject property to a public

road was represented by the defendants to be along the lane running
north from said property.

Plaintiffs have not sustained their

burden of proof to support their claim that defendants represented
that there was a legal access over the lane running south from the
subject property.
3.

Defendants did not misrepresent the condition of the

house on said premises, plaintiffs having had adequate opportunity
to inspect the same and having lived in the home for at least two
years before raising any questions regarding any deficiencies in
the construction thereof.
4*

Defendants did not make any fraudulent or negligent

misrepresentations to the plaintiffs regarding access to said
property or regarding the condition of the home thereon.
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5.

Access to the property from the north was insured by

the policy of title insurance obtained by the plaintiffs.
6.

Defendants were not obligated to pursue legal access

to the property from the south over the Tuckfield property,
7.

Bank refinancing for the money owed to defendants

under the Note and Trust Deed was reasonably available to plaintiffs had they pursued the matter further, particularly in view of
defendants' willingness to pay for the construction deficiencies
noted by the Millard County Building official and the lending
institution appraisers.
8.

No material mutual mistake of the parties has been

shown by the evidence adduced by plaintiffs.
9.

No material unilateral mistake on the part of

plaintiffs has been demonstrated sufficient to support a recision
of the contract between the parties.
10.

In any event, any rights which plaintiffs may have

had to recision under any state of facts was waived by the failure
of

plaintiffs

to

promptly

notify

defendants

of

plaintiffs'

intention to rescind the contract and by plaintiffs' failure to
tender back the subject property upon plaintiffs learning of the
lack of legal access over the Tuckfield property and upon learning
of alleged deficiencies in the construction of the house located on
the subject property.
11.

Plaintiffs have not produced evidence to support any

award for punitive damages against the defendants.
13

12.

Neither party has shown any legal basis to support

their respective claims for attorney fees. The plaintiffs have not
shown

sufficient

evidence

to

support

their

claims, and

the

defendants having purchased the property at the said Trustee's
Sale, the provisions for attorney fees in the Note and Trust Deed
were thereby extinguished.
13.

Plaintiffs' complaint and all causes of action

alleged therein should be dismissed "no cause of action."
14.

Defendants' counterclaim should be dismissed "no

cause of action," such claims having been obviated by the Trustee's
Sale.
15.

Each party should assume their own costs of court

and attorney fees.
DATED this £?^

day of January, 1992.

^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Defendants' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
to David Lambert, attorney for plaintiffs, Howard, Lewis &
Petersen, P.O. Box 778, Provo, UT 84603, postage prepaid, this
9*^- day of January, 1992.
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MILLARD COUNTY
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362 West Main

i^V.

Delta, UT 84624
(801) 864-2748
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LARRY L. MOSTRONG and JENNIFER
G. MOSTRONG,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
-vsLEEROY JACKSON and MARGARET R.
JACKSON,

:
Defendants.

Civil No. 8616

: Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
ooOoo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on
October 28 and 29, 1991 before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen,
District Judge, sitting at Fillmore, Millard County, Utah, and the
trial not having been completed on that date, further evidence and
closing arguments were heard on December 9, 1991 in Provo, Utah
County, Utah.
The plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel D.
David Lambert, Esq. The defendant appeared and was represented by
counsel Richard Waddingham, Esq. The Court having heard testimony
and the evidence adduced by the parties in support of their
respective positions; having reviewed the memoranda of counsel;
1

Depul

having reviewed the exhibits introduced into evidence at trial;
having heard the arguments of counsel; and having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED:
1.

Plaintiffs' complaint and all causes of action

alleged therein are hereby dismissed "no cause of action".
2.

Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed "no

cause of action".
3.

Plaintiffs and defendants are each ordered to assume

their own costs of court and attorneys' fees.
DATED this J?ZL

day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

lULLEN Y.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Defendants' Judgment to David Lambert, attorney for
plaintiffs, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, P.O. Box 778, Provo, UT
84603, postage prepaid, this
$'**' day of January, 1992.
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County had not as of that date employed a building inspector,
(T.225:2-25).
As further pointed out above, Larry Mostrong's testimony
that LeeRoy Jackson represented the home to be FHA approvable
(T.151:6-10) is antithetical to LeeRoy Jackson's testimony that
the only

representation

he made was that he had actually

constructed the house. (T.280:15-20).
Larry Mostrong testified that he inspected the home prior to
purchase (T.151:4-5); that he signed an Earnest Money Agreement
accepting the home in its present physical condition (T.151:2125,T.152:1-5); and that he did not enlist the help of a building
inspector prior to purchase, (T,152:6-9).
Nevertheless, Mostrongs resided in the home for approximately three years without any apparent difficulties with the
structure or improvements.
Mostrongs have not established

fraudulent or negligent

misrepresentation by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air
Conditioning, Inc., at 816, 824.
VI.

MOSTRONGS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF THE PARTIES REGARDING ACCESS TO THE
PROPERTY OR CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOME.
Mutual mistake requires that "...there is a clear bona

fide

mistake regarding material facts, without culpable negligence on
the part of the person complaining...." Davie v. Brownson, 3
Wash. App. 820, 478 P. 2d 258, 260 (1970) (Citing Lindberq v,
Murray, 177 Wash, 43, 201 P.2d 759, 763 (1921)).
A party claiming mutual mistake must show that the mistake
involved a "material fact" and "without culpable negligence" on
the part of the person complaining. Davie, at 260.
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The trial court determined

that

"[N]o material mutual

mistake of the parties has been shown by the evidence adduced by
[Mostrongs]." (Conclusion No. 8, R. 523)
Mostrongs suggest that there were clear bona fide

mistakes

regarding material facts as they related to access to the
property and construction of the property.
access has been addressed.

The issue regarding

The District Court found sufficient

evidence to establish that there was proper legal access to the
north

lane.

Furthermore, Mostrongs had possession

of the

property for approximately three years and obtained an easement
to the south lane.
Mostrongs assertion that there were mutual mistakes of fact
regarding construction of the home, has no merit. Financing was
never denied because the home did not comply with UBC standards,
it was denied because the FHA appraiser, Joseph Stott, was
concerned about three or four minor construction items. (T.119:516; Ex. 18). Mr. Stott testified that in jurisdictions that had
not adopted building codes, FHA has its own standards. Mr. Stott
further testified that had the items he checked on his appraisal
been corrected, there was nothing else he saw that would have
been a problem. (T.125:2-25,T.126:1-2).
There was no material mutual mistake of the parties that the
home was built strictly in accordance with the UBC, due to the
fact that such alleged noncompliance with the UBC had absolutely
no bearing on Mostrongs' ability to obtain financing. In June of
1991, Mostrongs hired a building inspector, Charles V. Hugo, and
a contractor, Carl Faulkner, to inspect the property and estimate
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costs of construction problems.6 (T.177:17-23). When asked which
UBC manual he used during his inspection of the home, Mr. Hugo
testified, "I didn't have a manual in my hand.

I was going by

past experience as an inspector and looking for, not necessarily
code violations, but problems." (T.181:2-10). Mostrongs raised
the issue regarding the UBC, after the fact, only in furtherance
of their lawsuit.
It may be expected that homes that are constructed in a
jurisdiction that have not adopted the UBC may well have some
construction deficiencies.
appraiser with
whether

all

22 years

homes

he

However, Steve Hatch, a real estate
experience

inspects would

(T.211:4-18), when
have

to meet

asked

the UBC,

testified, "No...obviously the older ones may not meet the most
up-to-date codes but still, if they are reasonably

accepted

market, they are in fact financed."(emphasis added)(T.220:17-25 ) .
Mostrongs did not meet their burden in trial court that
there was a material mutual mistake of the parties, nor have they
marshaled the evidence on this appeal to challenge the Court's
determination.

It is well established that:

[t]he Appellant must marshal all the evidence
which supports the trial court's findings and show
that, in the light most favorable to the finding, it is
6

Timely objection (T.186:9-12) was made on the grounds of
relevancy on Mr Hugo's and Mr. Faulkner's testimony based on the
fact that financing was not denied on account of the UBC
violations and that the cost of correcting the items set forth in
such inspection exceeded the cost of those items addressed by
Valley Central Bank as listed in the Stott Appraisal. (Ex. 18)
Furthermore, Faulkner's estimate of corrections was approximately
twice the amount testified to by Butch Jensen.
Faulkner
testified that he did not have experience as a building inspector, but that he took a "punch list" evaluating what he felt were
inadequacies with regard to the home. (T.195:10-23)
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against the "clear weight of the evidence", and is thus
clearly erroneous when applied to the foregoing legal
principles.
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT MOSTRONGS HAVE
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL UNILATERAL
MISTAKE ON THEIR PART TO SUPPORT A RESCISSION OF THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
Utah Courts have defined unilateral mistake as consisting of
the following elements:
1)

The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to
enforce
the
contract
as
actually
made
would
unconscionable•
The matter as to which the mistake was made must
relate to a material feature of the contract,
Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party
making the mistake*
It must be possible to give relief by way of rescission without serious prejudice to the other party
except the loss of his bargain. In other words, it
must be possible to put him in status
quo.

2)
3)
4)

Mostrongs have not established that there was a mistake of
"so grave a consequence" that to enforce the contract as actually
made would be unconscionable, nor have Mostrongs established that
there was a mistake of a "material" feature of the contract.
It has been established that there was legal access from the
property across the north lane to a public road.

It has further

been shown that Mostrongs cannot claim they exercised ordinary
diligence

in

determining

ascertaining
whether

a

the

legal

status
easement

of

the

existed

south
south

lane

in

of

the

property.
Valley Central denied financing due to four minor construction deficiencies.
to the contract.

Such noted deficiencies were not "material"

Mostrongs' witnessf Mr. Hugo, gave his general

impression of the home as "nice looking" with "a few problems
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that were correctable", and that could be fixed within a few
days.

(T.182:18-20, T.183:13-19 ) .

Millard County Building

Inspector, Jerry Reagan, testified that he could not find any
major construction problems with the home and what he did see as
problems were minor.

(T.230:9-18).7

Jacksons would be seriously prejudiced by a rescission of
the contract, based on the extended time they gave Mostrongs to
obtain

financing,

property,

Mostrongs'

Jacksons'

lost

continuous

rent

and

occupation

subsequent

of

expenses

the
in

restoring the property.
It is evident from the arguments made above, that there was
not a material mistake regarding financing, lack of access or
material structural defects of the home.
Mostrongs fail to marshal the evidence to support the
Court's

finding and

conclusion that there was no material

unilateral mistake on the part of Mostrongs sufficient to support
a rescission.
VIII.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BANK
REFINANCING FOR MONEY OWED TO JACKSONS UNDER THE NOTE
AND TRUST DEED WAS REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO MOSTRONGS
HAD THEY PURSUED THE MATTER FURTHER, PARTICULARLY IN
VIEW OF JACKSONS' WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES NOTED BY THE MILLARD COUNTY BUILDING
OFFICIAL AND THE LENDING INSTITUTION APPRAISERS.

A.

Mostrongs' Acquisition Of An Easement Over The South
Lane Of The Property And Jacksons' Willingness To
Correct The Construction Deficiencies, Guaranteed
Mostrongs Financing.

7

Wilford Jensen's testimony establishes that the cost of
correcting those items noted on Joseph Stott's appraisal would be
approximately $1,348.(1.265:11-25,1-266:1-25,1:267:1-17). Furthermore, Mostrongs' expert witness, Mr. Faulkner, testified it
would take approximately one to two days to correct such
deficiencies. (T.199:5-7). This shows that such problems were not
"material" to the construction of the home.
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Mostrongs submitted to Valley Central Bank in support of
their loan application the Millard County commitment to accept
the south lane as a county road, and testimony is unrebutted that
access was no longer an issue to financing- (T.41:25,T.42:1-11).
It has been shown that Valley Central Bank's refusal to
accept the loan application was due to those minor construction
deficiencies noted on Joseph Stott's appraisal. (T.220:17-25).
Nevertheless, in a show of good

faith, Jacksons

offered

to

correct any construction deficiencies associated with the home at
Jacksons' cost. (Exs. 34, 35;). Furthermore, Jacksons left the
door open by stating that even though they were going forward
with the Trustee's Sale, they would correct the construction
deficiencies if they could get a commitment from Mostrongs for
financing by the date of the sale. (T.288:5-18; Ex. 34, 35;
Addendums D, E; Finding No. 28, 29, R. 525, 526).
Jacksons never received a reply from Mostrongs to said
offers, (T.288:5-18) nor did Mostrongs tender the property back
to Jacksons or request a rescission of the contract. (T.289:814,T.290:17-23,T.100:12-19)
B.

Mostrongs' Efforts
Reasonable.

To

Obtain

Financing

Were

Not

The trial court's findings show that 1) Zions First National
Bank was willing to loan the necessary financing after Larry
Mostrong established residency and verification of income in Utah
for two years (T.71:8-17,T.153:1-19) ; Mostrongs made no application for financing from September 1, 1987 until approximately the
time

the Note became due on September

Jacksons

offered

to

carry

financing
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1, 1989
for

(T. 72; 7-13);

Mostrongs

for

an

additional year upon certain conditions—Mostrongs refused. (T.
286:7-17).

After all apparent impediments to financing were

removed, Mostrongs took no further steps to obtain bank or FHA
financing in order to pay off the Note.

(The aforementioned

facts support Finding No. 13, R. 531; Finding No. 18, R. 529;
Finding No. 24, R. 528; and Findings No. 29 and 30, R. 526).
Mostrongs argue that it would have been an exercise in
futility to attempt financing before September 1, 1989, because
of

the

two-year

waiting

period

required

to establish

Larry

Mostrong's residency and income verification in Utah.
The irony in Mostrongs' argument is that, if Larry Mostrong
was

required

to establish

a two-year

residency

in Utah

for

verification of income, under no possible circumstances could
Mostrongs ever have qualified for financing. The record is clear
that Larry Mostrong resided in California during much of the time
the contract was in effect and that he could not have established
the required proof of residency and income in Utah at the time
the Note became due. (T.73:21-25,T.74: 1-7,T.98:16-22,T.149:1325,T.150:1-17,T.153:2-27; Finding No. 18, R. 529).
The cases cited by Appellants in support of this argument
are inapposite. (Appellants' Brief P. 30). In each such case the
prospective buyer was denied financing for "insufficient income".
IX.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ANY RIGHTS
WHICH MOSTRONGS MAY HAVE HAD TO RESCISSION UNDER ANY STATED
FACTS WERE WAIVED BY THE FAILURE OF MOSTRONGS TO PROMPTLY
NOTIFY JACKSONS OF MOSTRONGS INTENTION TO RESCIND THE
CONTRACT AND BY MOSTRONGS FAILURE TO TENDER BACK THE
PROPERTY UPON MOSTRONGS LEARNING OF THE LACK OF LEGAL ACCESS
OVER THE SOUTH LANE AND UPON LEARNING OF ALLEGED
DEFICIENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE LOCATED ON THE
PROPERTY.
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Utah law is well established as to the responsibilities of
the party who elects to rescind a contract. In Parry v. Woodall,
438 P. 2d 813, (1968) the Utah Supreme Court announced the
responsibility of a party who elects rescission as a remedy. In
ruling that a party had waived his right to rescission of the
contract, the Court stated: "...one who claims he has been
deceived and elects to rescind his contract by reason of fraud or
misrepresentation
promptly

and

of

the

other

unequivocally

in

contracting

party must

announcing

his

act

intention".

(emphasis added) Id., at 815.
The Court further stated:
The law is well settled that one electing to
rescind a contract must tender back to the other
contracting party whatever property of value he has
received. Woodall elected to retain possession of the
corporate assets and to carry on the business until it
was taken over in the receivership proceedings. We are
of the opinion that Woodall waited too JLong, and that
he cannot now rescind the contract.
Id., at 815.
Waiver has been defined as "the voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right" and may be either express or
implied.

5 Williston on Contracts, § 678 (3rd Ed. 1961).

Express waiver, when supported by reliance thereon, excuses nonperformance of the waived condition. 5 Williston on Contracts, §
679 (3rd Ed. 1961); Restatement (2d) of Contract, § 84(1)(1981).
In considering waiver of a breach of a contract condition,
the Idaho Supreme Court stated in C.I.T. Corporation v. Hess, 395
P.2d 471 (1964) that:
Assuming plaintiff's breach was of a nature
sufficient to discharge defendant's obligation to
perform, it is well recognized that the obligation of
a party under a bilateral contract may be recreated by
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